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Significant attention has been paid to executive pay.  In over a thousand studies published 
on the topic of executive pay (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, and Franco-Santos, 2010), most of the 
research revolves around answering one question: are executives rewarded for the performance 
of their organization?  This literature, which is primarily based on agency theory, states that there 
is a separation of ownership and control in organizations, and because executives’ interests are 
likely to diverge from owners’ interests, executives may pursue their own interests over the 
interests of owners.  Agency theory proposes that pay-for-performance systems are a key 
mechanism organizations can use to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Therefore, under agency theory, an executive’s pay is expected to vary with the performance of 
the organization he or she leads.  
Yet, although there is a substantial amount of research that investigates pay-for-
performance in for-profit firms, the results are generally mixed.  Additionally, very few studies 
have addressed the pay incentives of nonprofit leaders.  Therefore, we are left without a clear 
understanding of how organizations are compensating their top executives and whether agency 
theory offers the best explanation of executive pay.   
My three-paper dissertation seeks to provide a better account of how organizations in 
different sectors use pay-for-performance systems to reward their top executives and why 
 organizations across sectors may compensate their CEOs differently.  More specifically, I 
investigate the pay-performance link in both for-profit firms and nonprofit organizations, which 
includes “charitable and religious” organizations and labor unions.  In the first chapter of my 
dissertation, I examine whether the strength of the relationship between executive pay and 
organizational performance increases with performance level, and how this relationship 
compares in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors and between female and male CEOs.  In my 
second dissertation chapter, I study whether nonprofit CEOs are paid based on organizational 
performance and what organizational factors affect the pay-performance relationship in 
charitable nonprofits.  Last, my third dissertation chapter focuses on the pay of union leaders by 
examining the extent to which two commonly used compensation theories, that is, agency theory 
and tournament theory, help explain the pay of union presidents. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
HOW STRONG ARE CEO REWARDS?  IT DEPENDS ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
ABSTRACT 
I examine whether the strength of the relationship between executive pay and organizational 
performance increases with performance level, and how this relationship compares in the for-
profit and nonprofit sectors and for female and male for-profit CEOs.  The media has focused on 
the idea that executives are rewarded highly for performing well, but not penalized as severely 
for performing poorly.  This suggests the link between pay and performance is weak for low 
levels of performance but increases as performance increases.  However, many researchers of 
executive pay have assumed the pay-performance link is linear and report a single estimate to 
describe this relationship.  I test this assumption using 2,678 unique for-profit firms and 13,466 
unique nonprofit organizations.  Controlling for size and for either individual or organizational 
fixed-effects, I find the relationship between for-profit CEO pay and performance is convex, that 
is, less strong at low levels of performance but increasingly strong at higher levels of 
performance.  In contrast, I find a linear relationship between nonprofit CEO pay and 
performance across levels of performance.  I find no difference in the pay-for-performance 
relationship between female and male CEOs.  Last, I find that a number of different components 
of total compensation are causing the convex relationship between pay and performance in for-
profit firms.  
 
 
 
 2 
A large literature exists on the relationship between executive pay and organizational 
performance (Murphy, 1999).  These studies, primarily based on agency theory, propose 
organizations seek to align the interests of their managers with the interests of owners by tying 
executives’ pay to measure of performance.  Although, most of the studies in this area support 
the idea that there is a positive and significant relationship between executive pay and 
organizational performance, the strength of this relationship is widely debated (Gerhart, Rynes, 
and Fulmer, 2009).  Some researchers have argued the relationship is strong (e.g. Murphy, 1985), 
whereas other researchers have argued the relationship is weak (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  Therefore, it remains unclear what the true relationship is between 
executive pay and organizational performance. 
The media focuses on the idea that executives are rewarded highly when performance is 
good but not penalized when performance is poor.  This suggests that the relationship between 
executive pay and organizational performance is weak for low levels of performance but is 
strong for higher levels of performance.  Yet, most researchers of executive pay have assumed 
the pay-performance link is linear and reported a single estimate to describe this relationship
1
.  
By reporting a single estimate, this research fails to account for the idea that the correlation 
between pay and performance may be different depending on the level of organizational 
performance.  If the media is correct, organizations may design executive compensation systems 
to provide more upside than downside risk, and this argument may help to address the mixed 
findings regarding the pay-for-performance relationship in the compensation literature.  
                                                        
1 It is important to note that this estimate differs across studies, and this may be due to a variety of reasons including 
the performance metric that is used and the functional form of the variables (Florin, Hallock, and Webber, 2010).  In 
this paper, I propose an additional reason for the different estimates found among studies.   
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Using Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp data on for-profit firms from 1993 to 2009 and 
IRS 990 data on nonprofit organizations from 1998 to 2003, I examine the shape of the pay-
performance relationship in both for-profit and nonprofit organizations.  In addition, I seek to 
uncover what part of executive compensation may be causing a nonlinear relationship by 
investigating the individual components of total pay.  Last, I consider whether there are 
differences in the shape of the relationship for male and female CEOs.  In summation, I ask in 
this paper: 1) does the strength of the relationship between pay and performance increase with 
performance level, 2) what part(s) of compensation may be causing a nonlinear pay-for-
performance relationship, and 3) how does the shape of the pay-performance relationship differ 
between for-profit and nonprofit organizations and for female and male for-profit CEOs? 
This study offers a number of contributions to the executive compensation literature.  
First, there is mixed evidence regarding the strength of the relationship between pay and 
performance;  some researchers argue the link is too weak to provide sufficient incentives for 
executives (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) while other researchers, who document a strong 
relationship between pay and performance, argue that CEO contracts are efficient (Murphy, 
1985; Hall and Liebman, 1998).  My study investigates an additional explanation for these 
inconsistent findings, that is, the strength of the link differs depending on performance.  Second, 
very recently authors have begun to recognize that certain factors can influence the degree of 
agency costs a firm incurs.  Boivie, Lange, McDonald, and Westphal (2011) examined pay data 
from 2,000 U.S. public companies and found that CEOs who identify closely with their 
organization are less likely to exert their influence to attain high levels of compensation when 
their firm is performing poorly.  My study builds on this work by studying whether certain 
factors affect the relationship between pay and performance, that is, certain factors may induce 
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organizations to expose pay more equally to both upside and downside risk.  Third, in this study, 
I break down compensation to examine whether the various forms of compensation have a 
different relationship with performance.  This allows me to investigate which parts of 
compensation may contribute to large upside pay gains for CEOs when performance is good and 
to very little downside pay losses for CEOs when performance is poor.   
 
BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
Traditional Views of Executive Pay and Performance 
Much of the research on the relationship between pay and performance is motivated by 
agency theory (Murphy, 1999; Gerhart, Rynes, and Fulmer, 2009).  Agency theory begins by 
recognizing that in most corporations there is a separation of ownership and control.  Because 
owners (principals) hire managers (agents) and delegate a substantial amount of control to them, 
problems may arise.  These problems are known as agency costs.  Specifically, agents are 
assumed to be risk averse, self-interested, and driven by different motives than principals (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).   
Pay-for-performance systems are used to alleviate the agency problem by aligning 
executives’ and shareholders’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992).  As 
Hall and Liebman (1998) stated, “Aligning the incentives of executives with those of owners is 
the most direct way to mitigate the agency problem” (pg. 654).  Compensation systems under 
agency theory are thought to be efficient and created in the best interest of shareholders.  Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) argued that shareholders’ main goal is to maximize their wealth, therefore 
agency theory predicts that CEO compensation should depend on shareholder wealth.  
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Previous studies examining executive pay and organizational performance have focused 
on measuring the strength of this relationship by reporting a single estimate.  Although the 
strength of the relationship may differ, a number of studies have reported a significant and 
positive association between pay and performance.  Murphy (1985) used data from 1964 to 1981 
and found a strong positive link between executive pay and performance.  Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) followed 2,213 CEOs using Forbes data and found that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for 
every $1000 change in shareholder wealth.  Although they found a positive and significant 
estimate, it is important to note that these authors argued that this relationship is small and does 
not provide adequate incentives for CEOs.  Hall and Liebman (1998) also documented a strong 
positive correlation between firm performance and CEO compensation by including the value of 
CEO holdings and stock and stock options in their measures of total compensation.  Further, 
countering the media and some researchers, Hall and Liebman (1998) found that CEOs can 
actually lose money and that this contributes to the large link they found between pay and 
performance.  Last, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), using data on large corporations over the 
1984 to 1991 period, documented that CEO pay (total compensation and total cash) increases by 
0.3 percent when shareholder wealth increases by 1 percent, and Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 
(2009), using data from 1997 to 2003 on 469 U.S. firms, found log CEO total pay and Tobin’s Q 
are significantly related with an estimate of 0.24.   
As illustrated in figure 1, the above discussion and past research suggests: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A positive and significant linear relationship exists between CEO pay 
and organizational performance across performance levels. 
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Nonlinear Relationship between Executive Pay and Performance 
Linear models used by researchers in previous studies to examine the relationship 
between pay and performance may have failed to capture how organizations actually structure 
CEO’s pay.  As the media indicates (e.g. Stewart, 2011; Krantz 2011; Craig, 2012), and as 
Crystal first noted in 1991, CEOs may be rewarded highly when performance is good but not 
penalized when performance is poor.  Crystal (1991) stated, “… pay has much more upside than 
downside elasticity” (pg. 98), which suggests the strength of the relationship increases as 
performance increases.  As mentioned above, the findings regarding the strength of the pay-
performance relationship are mixed.  This may be due to the changing relationship between pay 
and performance across the performance spectrum.  Both the managerial power hypothesis and 
agency theory provide explanations for why organizations may structure executive pay 
incentives to have a nonlinear relationship with organizational performance.   
Managerial Power Hypothesis.  Some researchers (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 
Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, and Carpenter, 2010) have argued that agency theory does not provide 
an adequate account of executive compensation practices in for-profit firms.  Specifically, 
Nyberg et al. (2010) wrote, “agency theory may not tell the whole story” (pg. 1029).  Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) proposed managerial power theory
2
 to help explain how for-profit executives 
are paid.  Managerial power hypothesis begins with the same problem of separation of ownership 
and control as agency theory; however, instead of predicting that pay incentives can be used to 
fix the agency problem, this theory suggests that board decisions and compensation packages are 
the result of an influence process that is managed by CEOs (Singh and Harianto, 1989; Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004).   
                                                        
2 Also known as skimming, managerialism, and rent extraction view.   
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Basically, the managerial power hypothesis suggests that managers use their position of 
power to obtain higher pay
3
 and this occurs at the expense of the owners of the organization 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  Rent extraction can occur in a number of different ways (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004).  First, managers, similar to most workers, simply would prefer to have more 
pay, so they may use their power over boards to receive higher pay than they could without 
power.  Second, under this theory is the idea that managers would prefer to bear less risk with 
their paychecks and would also prefer to enjoy as much slack as possible.  Yet, efficient 
compensation contracts are said to reduce slack, thereby discouraging managers from pursuing 
self-serving strategies (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  In essence, the managerial power hypothesis 
predicts that managers with power will, in fact, receive a high paycheck without cutting any 
managerial slack.  Last, this perspective predicts that because CEOs have power over their board 
of directors, they will be able to obtain high paychecks even when firm performance is poor.  
This would suggest that executive compensation packages are structured to avoid downside risk-
- when performance is poor, pay appears to be decoupled from performance.  As stated by 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) when describing the managerial power hypothesis
4
, executive pay 
packages will be designed “… so that pay is flexible to move up as firm performance improves 
but will not suffer if performance declines.  Therefore, variability, downside risk, and uncertainty 
are largely removed from their pay packages” (pg. 125).   
A pay package where high pay is decoupled from firm performance may be seen as 
inefficient to shareholders because “high pay and lavish perquisites given to CEOs regardless of 
firm performance require the use of resources that otherwise could be invested internally or 
                                                        
3 The additional pay that is above what a manager would receive under an efficient contract is known as rents.   
4 These authors call it managerialism.   
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distributed to shareholders” (Boivie et al., 2011, pg. 554). Therefore, under this theory, a pay 
package where pay and performance are strongly related when performance is good, but weakly 
related when performance is poor, does not appear to be in the best interest of shareholders.  The 
managerial power hypothesis suggests that because CEOs have power and influence, they will be 
able to obtain high pay regardless of performance.    
Agency Theory. Although the above arguments may seem to suggest that a nonlinear 
pay-performance relationship counters agency theory as a pay package that avoids downside risk 
is inefficient for shareholders, I believe that a nonlinear relationship may actually be predicted by 
agency theory.  Agents are risk averse because they are not diversified in both employment and 
compensation (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003).  Rappaport (1978, 1981, 1986) argued that executives 
are more risk averse than firm owners.  This is because if a firm fails to meet some performance 
standard, the penalty for the executive is termination of employment.  So an executive’s job (and 
therefore paycheck) is not protected by diversification in the same way as most stockholders’ 
portfolios (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  Yet due to shareholders’ investments being diversified, 
shareholders are naturally more risk neutral than managers.  Pay-for-performance contracts have 
desirable incentive properties for owners, but they tend to have unfavorable risk properties for 
executives (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003).  This suggests that the optimal contract, and most 
efficient executive pay contract for shareholders, may actually be nonlinear, that is less strongly 
related for low levels of performance but highly related for high levels of performance.  This 
type of pay arrangement may be efficient because by lessening the downside risk, executives 
may be more likely to pursue risky organizational decisions that could result in large payouts for 
shareholders. 
 9 
Some past researchers have noted that organizations must take CEO’s risk aversion into 
account when designing compensation packages to encourage executives to be more risky with 
their decisions. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued that CEOs are not risk neutral and that the 
reason public corporations were created was to achieve efficiencies in risk bearing.  Further, 
Frydman and Jenter (2010) claimed that the optimal compensation contract for CEOs must 
provide both the incentive for the CEO to take on risk and ensure the risk-averse manager is not 
exposed to too much volatility in his / her pay.  As stated by Jensen and Murphy (1990), “… 
CEO risk aversion coupled with even moderately high sharing rates in large companies will 
cause CEOs to avoid some high-risk positive NPV (net present value) projects that are optimal 
from the perspective of diversified shareholders” (pg. 657).  It is clear that owners use 
compensation to influence executives to make decisions that are aligned with their own risk 
preferences.  Because owners are more risk neutral than executives, the most efficient 
compensation contract for shareholders may be a contract that is highly tied to performance yet 
avoids downside risk.  
Does a Nonlinear Relationship Exist? Although the managerial power and agency 
frameworks take different perspectives on whether a nonlinear relationship between pay and 
performance is efficient for shareholders, both theories seem to suggest that organizations may 
structure executive pay practices to be highly related to performance when performance is good, 
but be less related to performance when performance is poor. 
A few previous studies have suggested the pay-performance relationship may be 
nonlinear.  Antle and Smith (1986) used a nonparametric test to examine executive pay and 
relative performance and found that linear models do not capture the shapes of compensation 
contracts. These authors plotted the residuals of total compensation against return and ROA and 
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found their results were suggestive of a nonlinear relationship between executive total 
compensation and performance.  Miller (1995) used Forbes data from 1983 to 1989 and found 
that there is no support for a linear relationship between pay and performance.  Specifically, by 
regressing salary on performance, defined as net profit divided by sales, he found a negative first 
term for performance, a large positive second term, and a smaller but positive third term
5
.  Last, 
Hall and Liebman (1998) noted (in footnote 30) when plotting their data, that there does not 
appear to be a linear relationship between total compensation and return.  
As shown in figure 2, the above discussion suggests: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The relationship between CEO pay and organizational performance is 
convex across performance levels (such that it is less strong at low levels of performance 
but increases with higher levels of performance).   
Components of Compensation and a Nonlinear Relationship  
If a nonlinear relationship exists in the link between pay and performance, the next 
important question to ask is, what part(s) of compensation is causing this to occur?  A convex 
relationship would suggest that pay and performance are decoupled when performance is poor, 
that is, executives are rewarded even when shareholders lose money, and that pay and 
performance are highly related when performance is good, so both executives and shareholders 
gain greatly when performance is good.  The managerial power perspective provides some 
explicit predictions on which components of pay are causing the decoupling of pay and 
                                                        
5 He does not control for organization or individual fixed-effects in the models addressing the functional form of the 
relationship. However, he does lag all his independent variables and controls for each year and each industry.  
Replicating Miller’s analysis with data from 1993 to 2009 and controlling for the 2-digit industry, I find positive and 
significant estimates on the first, second, and third performance term.  However, when I control for the organization 
or individual CEO with fixed-effects, none of the performance terms are significant.     
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performance when performance is poor, whereas agency theory provides us with some clear 
predictions on what parts of pay are leading to the strong relationship between pay and 
performance when performance is good.  Although agency theory does not speak directly about 
decoupling pay from performance, as I discussed above, the decreasing strength of the 
relationship at lower levels of performance does not conflict with an agency theory perspective 
because a nonlinear relationship may be most beneficial for shareholders who want executives to 
pursue risky decisions.  
The managerial power perspective suggests that when executives receive payouts even 
when performance is poor, it is likely to occur through pay practices that are less observable, 
easier to defend, appear to be based more on performance, and are more difficult to value 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Frydman and Jenter, 2010).  Specifically, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
argued that the decoupling of pay and performance happens through stock options, perquisites, 
pensions, and severance pay (Frydman and Jenter, 2010).  Further, Frydman and Jenter (2010) 
stated, “… the widespread use of “stealth” compensation is difficult to explain if compensation 
were simply the efficient outcome of an optimal contract.  Even though perks, pensions, and 
severance pay
6
 can be part of optimal compensation, hiding these compensation elements from 
shareholders is suggestive of rent extraction.  Similarly, the widespread practice of executives 
hedging exposures to their own firm, again with minimal disclosure, is difficult to justify” (pg. 
91).  Additionally, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argued that although bonuses are used to reward 
good performance, so a clear pay-performance relationship would be expected to exist for bonus 
pay, organizations have provided this form of pay even when objective performance is poor.  
                                                        
6 Known as “other” compensation.   
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This is because bonuses can be rewarded based on both objective (e.g. shareholder return and 
market value) and subjective (e.g. effective leadership or making strategic decisions) criteria.   
Therefore, the managerial power perspective suggests that “other” pay, option grants, and 
bonuses may have no relationship with measures of performance shareholders care about.  That 
is, “other” compensation, defined here to include perks, pensions, and severance, may have no 
relationship with performance because these forms of pay are negotiated at the beginning of an 
executive’s contract and rewarded regardless of performance.  As an example, severance 
packages are rewarded when a CEO performs so poorly he / she is asked to leave.  Further, 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argued that option grants are decoupled from performance because 
organizations have tended to either reload options that have been exercised or to reprice options 
that have fallen out-of-the-money.  By doing this, organizations are clearly providing additional 
pay to executives which is unrelated to organizational performance. Last, bonuses may have no 
relationship with performance measures that shareholders care about because bonuses are based 
on both subjective and objective criteria, so even if shareholders lose money, a board may still 
choose to award a bonus to an executive based on such things as meeting a budget, surpassing 
the previous year’s goals, making strategic decisions, or being an effective leader (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004).   
Therefore, the managerial power perspective suggests:  
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): There is no relationship between “other” pay and performance.     
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): There is no relationship between option grants and performance.   
Hypothesis 3c (H3c): There is no relationship between bonuses and performance.   
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Agency theory predicts that organizations seek to align the interests of executives with 
shareholders by linking their pay to organizational performance.  Hall and Liebman (1998) stated, 
“One of the key challenges of effective governance is solving the agency problem… the most 
direct solution to this agency problem is to align the incentives of executives with the interests of 
shareholders by granting (or selling) stock and stock options to the CEOs” (pg. 656).  Equity, 
both stock option grants and stock grants, provide executives with an ownership stake in the firm, 
and therefore create incentives for managers to pursue actions that are aligned with shareholders’ 
interests (Frydman and Jenter, 2010).  Further, Hall and Liebman (1998) argued that equity-
based pay may be the only way to create high-powered incentives for CEOs.  Additionally, 
bonuses are often used by organizations to explicitly tie pay to good performance (Murphy, 
1999) and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), which are bonuses based on performance over 
more than one year, have been widely promoted
7
 as a way to align executive and shareholder 
interests (Westphal and Zajac, 1994).  Therefore, agency theory predicts that option grants, stock 
grants, LTIP, and bonuses will be tied to performance.   
This suggests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3d (H3d): There is a positive and significant relationship between option 
grants and performance. 
Hypothesis 3e (H3e): There is a positive and significant relationship between stock grants 
and performance.   
Hypothesis 3f (H3f): There is a positive and significant relationship between LTIP and 
performance.   
                                                        
7 LTIPs are promoted but not often utilized by organizations (Westphal and Zajac, 1994).   
 14 
Hypothesis 3g (H3g): There is a positive and significant relationship between bonuses 
and performance
8
.   
Nonprofits and a Nonlinear Relationship 
Similar to for-profits, nonprofit board of directors set the pay, determine the pay policies 
and practices, and evaluate the performance of the CEO.  These directors often struggle with 
many of the same compensation issues faced by for-profit boards (Bowen, 2008).  However, 
ownership differs in the nonprofit sector.  Researchers of nonprofits typically discuss the 
governing board (e.g. Steinberg, 2006) as the closest comparison to owners in the for-profit 
sector
9
; however, these owners are said to have attenuated property rights (Steinberg, 2006).  
This is because while “ownership of an asset consists of the right to control its use and to enjoy 
its return” (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995, pg. 532), directors in nonprofits do not enjoy all these 
rights.  Nonprofit owners are able to control the use of the organization and transfer that control, 
but are not able to enjoy any profits generated by the organization.  
As stated above, agency theory begins with the separation of ownership and control and 
predicts that executives may pursue their own interests over the interests of owners. For-profit 
owners adopt pay-for-performance plans to ensure executives’ interests are aligned with their 
own interests.  Further, agency theory suggests that agents are risk-averse and boards design 
compensation systems that recognize this in order to influence executives to make more risky 
decisions.   
                                                        
8 Agency theory’s prediction on bonuses counters the prediction of managerial power hypothesis on bonuses.  As 
discussed above, bonuses can be based on a wide variety of performance metrics, so the relationship found between 
pay and performance may depend on the definition of performance.   
9 Though, some researchers have also argued that members (in the case of membership organizations) and donors 
can be described as quasi-owners of a nonprofit organization (Bowen, 2008).  
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 Although nonprofits are similar to for-profits in that there is a separation of ownership 
and control, nonprofit executives’ interests are much more likely to be aligned with the interests 
of the owners of the organization than would be expected in the for-profit sector.  Oster (1995) 
argued that people choose to work for nonprofits for ideological reasons and will sacrifice some 
of their pay to work for an organization they believe in.  Further, Rose-Ackerman (1987) 
contended that individuals who are attracted to nonprofit organizations care less about money, 
and Hansmann (1980) described nonprofit employees as “non-greedy”.  Pay does not appear to 
be the main driver of behavior for nonprofit employees, as these individuals would seek jobs in 
other sectors if it were.  This suggests that there is less of a need for alignment of interests 
through a pay-for-performance system in nonprofit organizations
10
.  Further, because nonprofit 
managers’ interests are already likely to be aligned with owners, nonprofit managers may even 
be willing to share some of the risk with the organization, which includes both the upside and 
downside risk.  Last, owners of nonprofits may not want managers to be too risky with their 
decisions because owners of nonprofits are not diversified like they are in for-profits, and 
nonprofit owners may be intrinsically invested in the organization and want to see this 
organization succeed.  This all suggests that lessening the downside risk in executive 
compensation packages may not be seen as an efficient strategy in nonprofits, and therefore the 
relationship between pay and performance may be consistent across good and bad performance 
in nonprofits.  
The managerial power hypothesis may also suggest a linear relationship between pay and 
performance in nonprofits.  This theory as well begins with the separation of ownership and 
control, but suggests that CEOs have power and use their power to obtain higher rents at the 
                                                        
10 Due to this explanation, a smaller link between pay and performance is likely to exist in the nonprofit sector.   
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expense of owners.  As Boivie at al. (2011) stated, “…high pay and lavish perquisites that are 
decoupled from firm performance create agency costs by benefiting a firm’s CEO while harming 
the firm’s finances and image…” (pg. 554).  I believe nonprofit executives are less likely to take 
advantage of their power to gain more compensation at the cost of owners of the organization, 
for the same reasons listed above, that is, they are attracted to nonprofits for ideological reasons 
and are less driven by money. 
Yet, mixed evidence regarding the pay-for-performance relationship has also been found 
in nonprofit organizations.  Using data from 1994, Oster (1998) found organizational size was a 
strong predictor of nonprofit executive compensation.  Hallock (2002) investigated the 
determinants of nonprofit executives’ pay with tax returns data from 1992 to 1996.  He also 
found a link between organization size and CEO pay; however, he noted that the pay-
performance link is only significant when performance is measured as organization size.  
Frumkin and Keating (2010) examined pay-for-performance of nonprofit CEOs using IRS 990 
data from 1998 to 2000 and found that nonprofit CEO pay is only modestly affected by 
performance.  It is possible that a nonlinear relationship between pay and performance also exists 
in nonprofit organizations, and if found, will help to explain the mixed findings in this literature.  
However, as I explained above, I expect the relationship is more likely to be linear than in the 
for-profit sector.   
Therefore the above discussion suggests:  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The relationship between nonprofit CEO pay and performance is 
linear across performance levels. 
 
 17 
Gender and a Nonlinear Relationship 
 In general, researchers investigating gender and pay-for-performance systems have 
found differences in how female and male executives are paid (e.g. Albansi and Olivetti, 2008; 
Selody, 2010; Kulich, Trajanowski, Ryan, Haslam, and Renneboog, 2011) and that these 
differences in variable pay explain a significant portion of the gender wage gap (Munoz-Bullon, 
2010).  However, I believe that while managerial power theory suggests that there will be a 
different shape between pay and performance for male and female executives, agency theory 
suggests a different result -- that a similar shape between pay and performance exists for female 
and male executives.  Specifically, I believe the managerial power hypothesis predicts that males 
are shielded from downside risk, yet females are equally exposed to both upside and downside 
risk in their pay packages.  Conversely, agency theory predicts that organizations offer pay 
packages that provide high gains but low penalties to both female and male CEOs.   
Female CEOS may have less power in their organization due to being younger, having 
lower tenure, and having limited access to informal networks than male CEOs (Albanesi and 
Olivettti, 2008).  Under the managerial power hypothesis, this would suggest that females are 
less entrenched than male CEOs and, therefore, female CEOs may have less control over their 
boards.  This may indicate that organizations that have female CEOs may design CEO 
compensation packages to be exposed to both upside and downside risk which would support a 
linear relationship between pay and performance.  
Previous studies on the pay-for-performance relationship between female and male 
executives have found differences in how top managers are compensated. Albanesi and Olivetti 
(2008) found that female pay is more sensitive to bad performance and less sensitive to good 
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performance than male pay.  They argued that the managerial power hypothesis explains this 
finding.  Specifically, they contended that the efficient contracting model cannot explain why 
“females are more exposed to the risk of adverse firm performance and why their compensation 
is less sensitive to aggregate stock market conditions” (pg. 4).  In addition, Selody (2010) found 
that women have a similar pay-to-performance sensitivity as men when firm market value 
increases, but twice the sensitivity when market value decreases
11
.   
Agency theory assumes agents are risk averse and as I discussed above, I believe 
organizations may reduce the downside risk in CEO pay packages to ensure CEOs are making 
risky decisions.  A number of studies have suggested that women are more risk averse than men 
(Hallock and Olson, 2009), which may suggest a nonlinear relationship will be more likely to be 
found for female executives because these executives may be less likely to make risky decisions.  
Specifically, Hallock and Olson (2009) argued that men tend to be more overconfident than 
women, and this may lead men to take more risks than women.  For example, Eckel and 
Grossman (2002), using subjects in a laboratory experiment, asked both women and men to 
choose among five alternative gambles with different financial stakes.  These authors found that 
women are significantly more risk-averse than men; that is, women are more likely to choose the 
least risky gamble, whereas men are more likely to choose the most risky gamble.  Powell and 
Ansic (1997) used two computerized laboratory experiments to examine whether risk-taking 
differences found in previous studies between women and men can be explained by context.  
These authors found that females are less risk seeking irrespective of the context.  Last, Byrnes, 
Miller, and Schafer (1999) conducted a meta-analysis of 150 studies on risk-taking. Their results 
suggested that males are more likely to show risk-taking behaviors.  This discussion indicates 
                                                        
11 She argued that this is consistent with boards exhibiting an attribution bias against females. 
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that females tend to be more risk averse than males, and therefore, organizations with female 
CEOs may structure pay to be highly related to performance yet avoid downside risk to ensure 
these managers are making risky decisions.  
Managerial power hypothesis and agency theory offer the following conflicting 
predictions regarding the relationship between pay and performance: 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The relationship between female CEO pay and performance is linear 
across performance levels, whereas the relationship between male CEO pay and performance 
is convex across performance levels. 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The relationship between female CEO pay and performance and the 
relationship between male CEO pay and performance are convex across performance levels.   
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
Previous work investigating the pay-performance relationship using agency theory has 
estimated the following equation:  
 lnCit = 1lnPit + 2lnAit + 3Xit + i + it   (1) 
where C is the total compensation of the CEO, P is performance (defined as return in for-profits 
or revenue for nonprofits), A is the total assets of the organization, X is CEO-specific variables 
such as age and tenure, and (i + it) represents the error term that contains both transitory and 
permanent effects. Organizations and time are represented by the subscripts i and t.    
The above model assumes that the relationship between pay and performance is 
consistent across performance levels.  To examine whether this assumption is true, I included an 
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additional variable, performance-squared, to my model.  Therefore, my basic empirical model 
becomes:  
 lnCit = 4lnPit + 5lnP
2
it + 6lnAit + 7Xit + i + it  (2) 
with the inclusion of performance-squared to estimate whether the relationship between 
compensation and performance changes with higher performance.  If a convex relationship exists 
between CEO pay and organizational performance, 5 will be positive and significant.   
It is unlikely that the
 
organizational characteristics fully explain the pay of the CEO in 
both for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Additionally, omitted variables may confound the 
relationship between pay and performance.  Therefore, I included organizational fixed-effects to 
control for all observable and unobservable organizational characteristics that do not change over 
time.  The estimates from equation (2), with the inclusion of organizational fixed-effects, will be 
consistent if I assume that endogeneity comes only from time-invariant sources.  Further, by 
controlling for the organization, I am able to look within organizations to determine how the 
variation of the independent variables (e.g. performance) affects the variation of the dependent 
variable (that is, total compensation).   
 
METHODS AND DATA 
Data 
The data on for-profit organizations comes from Standard & Poor’s EXECUCOMP 
database for the years of 1993 to 2009.  All organizations in the for-profit sector are required to 
disclose basic financial information and information regarding the pay of the five highest-paid 
employees to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  I deleted any observations where 
 21 
pay, market value, and assets are missing or less than 1,000.  Further, I dropped all observations 
where my main performance variable, that is, return, was greater than 1000%.  This resulted in 
an average return of approximately 17%, which is similar to previous studies using return as 
performance (e.g. Nyberg et al., 2010; Wowak et al., 2011; Kulich et al., 2011).  Last, I dropped 
all observations where gender was missing for the CEO.  Finally, I was left with 23,295 
observations of data for 2,678 unique firms.  
The data on nonprofit organizations comes from tax returns of 501c(3) tax-exempt 
organizations for the years of 1998 to 2003; specifically, the sample included in this paper are 
organizations that file Form 990.  For an organization to be officially designated as a nonprofit, it 
must file forms with the IRS. Registered nonprofits are excluded from having to pay taxes but 
are required to file Form 990 if their net revenue is greater than $25,000. More than half of 
nonprofit organizations are 501c(3) organizations, also known as charitable organizations. 
According to the IRS, nonprofits are considered charitable because they serve “broad public 
purposes include[ing] educational, religious, scientific, and literary activities, among others, as 
well as the relief of poverty and other public benefit actions” (Stevenson, Pollak, and Lampkin, 
1997).  I deleted from my sample all observations where pay, assets, and revenue is missing or 
less than 1,000, and where pay is greater than $10 million.  This resulted in 50,512 observations 
of data, which represents 13,466 unique organizations.  
Measures 
Total compensation. My main dependent variable for both for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations was total compensation for the CEO of each organization.  In the for-profit sector, 
total compensation included salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted 
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stock granted (total amount awarded during the year), total value of stock options granted (total 
amount awarded during the year), long-term incentive payouts, and other.  The total 
compensation measure I used in this study included the value of options when they were granted.  
Previous research has included the value of stock options when they were exercised; however, as 
discussed by Hallock (2004), including the value of stock option grants instead provides a more 
accurate picture of the actual pay that an executive receives in a given year.  Further, similar to 
previous studies (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), I used total compensation granted in the 
same year for most of my analyses.  In additional analyses, I examined how performance affects 
different components of compensation.  Following Frydman and Jenter (2010), I defined the 
basic components of compensation as: 1) salary, 2) bonus, 3) LTIP (long-term incentive plans 
are bonus plans based on more than one year and are paid out in both equity and cash), 4) stock 
option grants, 5) stock grants, and 6) other annual (which includes perks, defined benefit pension 
plans, severance payments, etc.).   
In the nonprofit sector, I defined total compensation as the sum of base compensation 
(which includes salary, fees, bonuses, and severance payments paid), contributions to employee 
benefit plans and deferred compensation, and expense account and other allowances.   
Performance.  My main objective was to examine whether the relationship between pay 
and performance changed, specifically increased, as performance increased.  Therefore, defining 
performance was critical.  Based on past studies (Murphy, 1985; Wowak et al., 2011), I defined 
performance in the for-profit sector as total shareholder return (TSR).  Hall and Liebman (1998) 
argued that return is a better measure than shareholder wealth, because looking at CEO wealth in 
regards to market value is a “misleading picture of pay to performance” as the denominator is so 
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large that the change in CEO wealth, of course, appears very small (pg. 656).  Further, instead of 
using accounting measures of performance, such as net income and return on assets, I used return 
measures, because as stated by Gerhart et al. (2009), “excluding shareholder return in measuring 
firm performance is likely to lead to biased estimates of the strength of the overall incentive 
alignment” (pg. 285).  Because return can be negative and I want to look at the elasticity of CEO 
pay to return, I specifically defined performance as the log of return plus one (similar to Murphy, 
1986).   
As I indicated above, performance in the for-profit sector has been defined in a number of 
ways.  Therefore, I also tested my main hypotheses with additional measures of performance.  In 
addition to return, I used net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations as a 
measure of accounting performance (similar to Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), and I also 
used shareholder wealth (similar to Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  Last, I tested my main 
hypotheses with lagged performance because some parts of compensation may be rewarded 
based on the previous year’s performance.   
My main measure of nonprofit performance was total revenue.  As stated by 
Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell (2006), “organizational research has shown that nonprofits 
are driven by resource enhancement” (pg. 340).  However, performance can also be defined in a 
number of different ways in the nonprofit sector.  So, I also tested whether there is a nonlinear 
relationship between nonprofit CEO pay and organizational performance when performance is 
defined as total assets (similar to Hallock, 2002).   
Control variables.  Several measures were used as controls in my study, many of which 
have been found in previous studies on CEO pay.  I used total assets as a control for firm size in 
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both the for-profit and nonprofit sector.  Further, both age and tenure have been found to be 
important determinants of pay (Murphy, 1986; Hill and Phan, 1991), so in the for-profit sector I 
also controlled for the age of the CEO and tenure of the CEO, as well as included the squared 
terms for each of these variables
12
.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for for-profit organizations, and provides separate 
descriptive data for organizations lead by male CEOs and female CEOs.  All monetary values 
were changed to 2003 dollars.  Table 2 reports the summary statistics for nonprofit CEOs and is 
also displayed in 2003 dollars.  It is clear that nonprofit CEOs are paid significantly less than for-
profit CEOs.  That is, on average nonprofit CEOs are paid $191,542, whereas for-profit CEOs 
are paid on average $4,825,855.  Further, it is clear that for-profit organizations are much larger 
than nonprofit organizations, as seen by comparing the total assets for for-profits of 
approximately $13 billion to the average for nonprofit organizations of $124 million.   
Table 3 shows the regression results for the test of a nonlinear relationship between pay 
and performance.  Model 1 includes control variables and performance, that is, logged (1 + 
return).  This model, similar to past studies, appears to indicate that there is a significant and 
positive linear relationship between CEO pay and organizational performance, which seems to 
provide support for hypothesis 1.  However, in Model 2 I added performance-squared in order to 
test hypothesis 2, which posits that the relationship between pay and performance is not linear 
                                                        
12 The sign and significance of my main results did not change when I left out the age and tenure variable from 
regressions of for-profit CEO pay.  I did this in order to compare the for-profit pay results to the regressions of 
nonprofit CEO pay because I did not have data on CEO characteristics in the nonprofit sector.   
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but actually increases with performance.  Hypothesis 2 counters the prediction of hypothesis 1.  
It is clear by looking at models 2 through 6 that there is a positive and significant estimate on 
performance squared. Model 3 includes year effects and model 4 also includes industry effects.  
Model 5 controls for the organization, and last, model 6 controls for the individual.  In each 
model, the estimate on the squared performance measure is positive and significant.  This 
indicates that the relationship between pay and performance is not linear but, instead, convex and 
provides support for hypothesis 2.   
To further examine the shape of the relationship between pay and performance, in table 4, 
I created dummy variables based on an organization’s performance in a given year compared to 
performance of a) other organizations in the same two-digit code and b) all organizations in the 
market.  The dummy left out of each regression is the 0 to 20 percent dummy, which indicates 
that the organization performed in the lowest 20% compared to its industry or the overall market.  
Equation (1) and (4) includes controls for the industry, equation (2) and (5) includes controls for 
the organization, and equation (3) and (6) includes controls for the individual.  Looking at each 
regression in the table, it appears that the relationship between pay and performance increases as 
performance increases but increases more substantially at greater levels of performance.  This 
provides further support for hypothesis 2.   
Because both contemporaneous and lagged performance have been found to be important 
determinants of CEO pay, in table 5 I ran regressions of CEO compensation on lagged 
performance and lagged performance squared.  Panel A displays the results of regressions with 
only lagged performance, whereas panel B displays the results of regressions including both 
lagged performance and contemporaneous performance.  In panel A, it is clear that the 
coefficient on the lagged squared performance variable is positive and significant even when 
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controlling for the organization in column (5) and the individual CEO in column (6).  In panel B, 
both the squared performance variable and the lagged squared performance variable are positive 
and significant in every model.  These results are again consistent with tables 3 and 4 and 
provide support for hypothesis 2.   
Last, in table 6 and 7, I tested hypothesis 2 with additional means of examining the pay-
for-performance relationship.  Specifically, in table 6, I used an accounting measure of 
performance, net income
13
, and in table 7, I estimated the pay-performance sensitivity.  Again, 
similar to the results with market-based performance, I find a convex relationship between 
executive pay and net income in table 6.  Table 7 displays the results of the regressions of the 
change in total compensation on the change in shareholder wealth and the change in shareholder 
wealth squared
14
, and the regression of the change in the log compensation on the log return and 
log return squared
15
.  It is clear that the squared terms are significant in all models, again 
providing support for hypothesis 2.  All of the results discussed above seem to suggest that the 
relationship between pay and performance is not linear as is assumed in most previous studies 
examining the strength between executive pay and organizational performance.  Instead, the 
relationship appears to be convex, that is, less strong at lower levels of performance but increases 
as performance increases.   
In table 8, I investigated which parts of compensation may be causing the nonlinear 
relationship between pay and performance.  I broke down compensation into salary, bonus, LTIP, 
option grants, stock, and “other”, and further defined compensation as the log of (y + 0.01).  I did 
                                                        
13 I did not log net income because this can be negative.  Specifically, 3,802 organization-years have negative net 
income.   
14 This estimates the Jensen and Murphy (1990) statistic but includes the squared performance term. 
15 This is similar to the regression used in Murphy (1986).   
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this because in many organizations compensation data is zero for at least one component of pay. 
Therefore, this set-up allowed me to include all organizations in my sample even if they do not 
provide their CEO with any one form of compensation.  For each dependent variable, I regressed 
log (form of compensation + 0.01) on performance, performance squared, size, CEO 
characteristics, and either included organizational or individual fixed-effects.  Looking at table 8, 
and focusing on the columns that include individual fixed-effects as these are the most 
conservative tests of my hypotheses, it appears that no relationship exists between salary, option 
grants, and “other” compensation and performance.  As hypothesized, this provides evidence for 
hypotheses 3a and 3b.  Further, there appears to be a linear and positive relationship between 
both stock grants and LTIP and performance
16
.  It is important to note that the measure of stock 
in this study is the amount awarded in stock grants
17
, and therefore the measure represents a 
reward by the organization and is not explicitly based on the value of the same underlying assets 
as return, that is, company stock.  The linear results of stock and LTIP support hypotheses 3e and 
3f.  Last, there appears to be a nonlinear / convex relationship between bonus and performance.  
Table 9 compares pay and performance in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.  All 
models include both year and organizational fixed-effects.  Whereas the squared performance 
variable is positive and significant in for-profit firms, the squared performance variable is not 
significant in nonprofit organizations.  Further, adding the squared term in the nonprofit sector 
does not explain any additional variation in CEO pay, which is evident by looking at the R-
squared.  I find similar results when using total assets as performance and controlling for size 
with total revenue, but choose not to present them here.  The results in table 9 seem to provide 
                                                        
16 The significance of LTIP and performance is small.  This may be due to the small number of organizations that 
award LTIP; specifically, only 651 organizations awarded LTIP in the years of my data.   
17 This is not based on the revaluation of stock holdings.   
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support for hypothesis 4, that is, the relationship between nonprofit CEO pay and performance is 
linear
18
.    
Finally, I compared whether a different shape exists between pay and performance for 
female and male for-profit CEOs in table 10.  I did not control for CEO age or CEO tenure in 
this analysis, as these may contribute to females having less power over their boards.  By 
focusing on the models for organizational and individual fixed-effects, columns (4) and (6), it is 
clear that the estimates on the squared terms are positive but not significant for female CEOs
19
.  
However, the non-significance is likely due to the small number of observations for females, as 
there are very few female CEOs in the for-profit sector.  Therefore, by comparing the results for 
female and male CEOs in columns (3) – (6), there appears to be a nonlinear relationship between 
pay and performance for both female and male CEOs in the for-profit sector.  That is, the results 
in table 10 seem to support hypothesis 5b.  These results suggests that organizations appear to 
structure pay packages for their male and female CEOs similarly where both male and females 
are rewarded highly for good performance but not being penalized as severely for poor 
performance.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Previous research examining the strength of the link between CEO pay and 
organizational performance has reported a single estimate to describe this relationship, which 
                                                        
18 To further investigate this, I created dummy variables based on an organization’s performance compared to it’s 
own industry and compared to the overall nonprofit sector.  These results are presented in appendix A.  Looking at 
columns (1) and (3), there appears to be a linear relationship between pay and performance.  However, when 
focusing on columns (2) and (4), which include organizational fixed-effects, it is unclear whether the relationship 
between nonprofit CEO pay and performance exists.  I investigate this further in Klein (2012).   
19 These results do not change when including age and tenure variables.   
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assumes that the relationship is linear and consistent across performance.  However, the findings 
of this study strongly support the predictions of a nonlinear relationship between CEO pay and 
organizational performance.  Specifically, I find the relationship between for-profit CEO pay and 
organizational performance is weaker at low levels of performance but stronger at higher levels 
of performance.  Additionally, these results hold even with a number of different performance 
measures, across a number of different empirical specifications, and with both contemporaneous 
and lagged performance.  These results may help address the mixed findings regarding the 
relationship between pay and performance in the executive compensation literature, and they 
suggest that the relationship between pay and performance is more complex than previous 
research has portrayed.   
Further, by breaking down compensation, I was able to examine which forms of 
compensation are likely causing this convex relationship between pay and performance.  
Looking at the different forms of compensation, it appears that there is no relationship between 
salary, option grants, and “other” pay and organizational performance.  Further, I find a convex 
relationship between bonus pay and performance.  Last, I find a positive and significant linear 
relationship between LTIP and stock grants and organizational performance.  All of these 
components of pay combined are likely leading to the nonlinear relationship between CEO pay 
and performance.  That is, when all the different parts of compensation are combined, executives 
appear to be rewarded highly for good performance yet not penalized when performance is poor.  
The components of compensation that are not related to performance are leading to the 
decoupling of pay and performance at lower levels of performance as these specific components 
allow executives to receive a payout even when performance is low.  Whereas, the forms of pay 
that are strongly related to performance, specifically stock grants, are causing the strong and 
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steep relationship between pay and performance at higher levels of performance, thus providing 
executives with the link between their paychecks and owners’ interests.  Last, bonus pay appears 
to incorporate both the decoupling of pay at lower levels of performance and the strong 
relationship between pay and performance when performance is good.  As the managerial power 
hypothesis predicts, this unique relationship may be due to how the bestowment of bonus pay is 
based on both objective and subjective measures.  Furthermore, I find the results of this analysis 
to show that both the managerial power hypothesis and agency theory are useful perspectives in 
explaining which parts of compensation cause the nonlinear relationship between executive pay 
and organizational performance.   
Although a nonlinear relationship appears to exist in for-profits, I find a different pattern 
exists between CEO pay and performance in the nonprofit sector.  I find the relationship between 
nonprofit CEO pay and organizational performance, defined as total revenue, is linear.  This may 
suggest that in organizations where the interests of managers and owners are more aligned, 
managers may be more willing to share equally in both the upside and downside risk.  Further, 
these initial findings may indicate that in these organizations, there may be less of a need for 
boards to structure executive pay with the purpose of avoiding downside risk.  However, future 
research should further investigate this.   
Last, I find no difference between how female and male CEOs are paid.  Both female and 
male executives’ pay appear to have a convex relationship with organizational performance.  
This finding may indicate that the nonlinear relationship is efficient for shareholders, and it 
provides support for agency theory.  Yet, more research needs to be done to differentiate 
between the two explanations provided here regarding the nonlinear relationship.   
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The results of this study suggest that future research on the pay-performance link should 
not assume the relationship is linear.  Although this may complicate future work on the topic, it 
is clear from this study that the pay-performance relationship changes with performance level.  
Therefore, recognizing this dynamic relationship is essential to truly understanding how 
organizations design executive pay practices.   
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations in this study.  First, I am assuming that the interests of 
nonprofit executives are more aligned with the interests of owners.  This, of course, is an 
assumption, and future research should do surveys or interviews with executives in nonprofits to 
better understand how aligned these interests are.  Second, due to availability of data, I do not 
have controls in my nonprofit regressions for individual characteristics.  These are important 
determinants of CEO pay, and future studies should incorporate these measures.  Third, I do not 
have strong measures of CEO power, therefore I am unable to test between the two theoretical 
frameworks I propose here as explaining the convex relationship.  This would be an interesting 
direction for future studies.  Fourth, I do not examine whether the nonlinear relationship is 
actually good for future organizational performance, nor do I examine whether the offering of 
pay packages that avoid downside risk affects the pool of CEO talent.  For example, one reason 
organizations may offer pay that is decoupled from poor performance is to attract high quality 
CEOs who may be offered these attractive pay packages in other organizations.  Looking at these 
outcomes would provide us with information on whether these pay packages are efficient and 
would provide a test between agency theory and managerial power hypothesis.  This should be a 
focus of future studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CEO PAY AND INTEREST ALIGNMENT: A PANEL STUDY ON PAY-FOR-
PERFORMANCE IN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I examine the relationship between CEO pay and organizational performance in 
nonprofit organizations.  Two theories, agency theory and stewardship theory, offer opposing 
predictions on the pay-performance link in organizations.  Whereas agency theory suggests a 
positive link between pay and performance, stewardship theory suggests that in some 
organizations there may be no link between pay and performance.  It is unclear which theory 
provides a better explanation of nonprofit CEO pay.  This is an interesting context in which to 
examine compensation, because, unlike for-profit executives, nonprofit executives are assumed 
to be less motivated by money, and their interests more aligned with those of organization 
owners. Nevertheless, there is significant variation in the strength of the relationship between 
pay and performance within this sector. Using compensation data on 13,200 unique nonprofit 
organizations from 1998 to 2003, on average I find as revenue increases, so does the pay of the 
nonprofit CEO.  However, this only applies in a few nonprofit industries.  Additionally, I find the 
relationship between pay and performance is stronger in smaller nonprofits, younger nonprofits, 
nonprofits with less diverse funding sources, nonprofits with stronger boards, and nonprofits 
with for-profit competitors, which suggests agency theory may be more applicable to these types 
of organizations.  
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An extensive amount of research on executive pay is based on agency theory.  Agency 
theory acknowledges that in most firms, there is a separation between the owners of the 
organization (known as the principals) and the managers who are delegated control over the 
organization (known as the agents).  This type of arrangement creates agency costs, as situations 
may arise where the interests of the principal and the interests of the agent diverge. In these 
instances, it is likely the agent will pursue his / her own interests over the wishes of the principal, 
thereby evoking agency costs.  Agency theorists argue that it is possible to reduce agency costs 
through pay incentives and monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
Although agency theory is the dominant theory used by executive pay researchers 
(Murphy, 1999), in some organizations the interests of agents and the interests of principals may 
actually converge.  Stewardship theory, as discussed by Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997), is used to explain these situations and suggests that the 
mechanisms recommended by agency theory may be redundant and even counterproductive in 
organizations where the interests of agents are aligned with the interests of principals (Lee and 
O’Neill, 2003).  Echoing a number of authors, including Deci (1971) and Kohn (1993), Deci, 
Ryan, and Koestner (1999) claimed, “tangible rewards tend to have a substantially negative 
effect on intrinsic motivation”, and Pink (2009) argued that these rewards do more harm than 
good when mixed with jobs that are interesting, imaginative, and moral.   
Nonprofit executives are assumed to be less motivated by money and their interests are 
assumed to be more aligned with owners of the organization than the typical for-profit executive.  
Oster (1995) argued that nonprofit workers are committed ideologically to the organization they 
join, and Mirvis and Hackett (1983) found that individuals working for nonprofits report that 
their jobs are more important to them and that they have a stronger dedication to their jobs than 
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their counterparts in the for-profit sector.  Further, Hansmann (1980) argued that people who go 
into the nonprofit sector are not motivated strictly by money; he characterized these individuals 
as “nongreedy”.  Yet, there is significant variation in the pay of top executives of nonprofits, and 
many nonprofits use pay incentives to motivate their employees (Rocco, 1991; Casteuble, 1997; 
Hallock, 2000; 2002).  Therefore, nonprofits appear to be an ideal context to examine the pay-
for-performance relationship, as some nonprofit organizations have adopted these systems to 
motivate their managers even though it is more likely that the interests of nonprofit managers are 
more aligned with the interests of owners than is discussed in the for-profit literature. 
 In this paper, I test whether agency theory or stewardship theory provides a better 
explanation of the nonprofit CEO pay.  Further, I examine, in a setting that is more likely to be 
characterized by convergence of agents’ and principals’ interests, if certain situational factors 
may help to explain the use of control mechanisms discussed in agency theory.  That is, given 
the diversity of the nonprofit sector, I seek to uncover what types of organizations are more 
likely to use pay-for-performance systems to reward their top executive.  These characteristics 
may shed light on the applicability of agency theory and stewardship theory in organizations 
where interests are aligned.  Therefore, I address: 1) what theory provides a better explanation of 
nonprofit CEO pay, 2) does the relationship between pay and performance differ across nonprofit 
industries, and 3) what types of organizations are more likely to use pay-for-performance 
practices in the nonprofit sector?  I answer these questions using IRS 990 data on 13,200 unique 
nonprofit organizations from 1998 to 2003.  
 This paper contributes to the executive compensation literature in a number of ways.  
First, we know very little about how executives are paid in nonprofits (some exceptions are 
Preston, 1989; Oster, 1998; Hallock, 2002).  Therefore, the results from this study should add to 
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our understanding of nonprofit managerial compensation.  Second, as Gerhart and Rynes (2003) 
suggested, it seems likely that most firms exist on a continuum between divergence and 
convergence of agent and principal interests.  Therefore, understanding what factors affect the 
adoption and use of control mechanisms, that is, pay incentive and monitoring, in nonprofit 
organizations should add to our understanding of what affects the adoption of these practices 
across organizational sectors, and should further add to our understanding of agency theory and 
stewardship theory.  Wasserman (2006) examined what factors affect the applicability of agency 
theory or stewardship theory in new ventures by comparing CEO pay levels of founders and non-
founders.  Although this study provided us with insightful information regarding executive pay, 
Wasserman did not actually measure incentive schemes or monitoring in new ventures, and 
therefore he could not test the actual predictions of agency theory.  In this paper, I add to 
Wasserman’s (2006) study by addressing the strength of pay-for-performance relationship and 
by investigating which factors affect the use of this control mechanism, which is argued to align 
executives’ and owners’ interests, in a setting where one would expect to find these interests 
already aligned.  Last, more and more people are looking for jobs that are meaningful, jobs in 
which they feel they are making a difference (Michaelson, 2010).  Yet, we know very little about 
how to pay people in these organizations.  This research should help add to our knowledge on 
meaningful work by addressing what types of pay practices are used to motivate individuals in 
these types of jobs.   
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THEORETICAL REVIEW 
 Both agency theory and stewardship theory are useful in explaining executive 
compensation; however, as Wasserman (2006) suggested, each theory may be more applicable to 
executives and situations to which the other theory is less applicable.  
Agency Theory 
 The main argument underlying agency theory is that owners (principals) delegate control 
of the firm to managers (agents) who are expected to maximize the value of the firm.  However, 
agents and principals are both motivated by opportunities to maximize their own utility.  If the 
interests of both agents and principals match, then there are no agency costs.  But the chance that 
the interests diverge is quite large, and, therefore, given the opportunity, agents may rationally 
pursue their own interests over the interests of the principal-- an act that results in agency costs 
for the principal (Davis et al., 1997).  To reduce these agency costs, principals may implement a 
number of governance mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Although both monitoring and 
incentive schemes have been argued to reduce agency costs, here I focus strictly on pay schemes.   
Stewardship Theory 
 The key argument of stewardship theory is that in some organizations the interests of 
managers may be more aligned with owners than agency theory proposes (Davis, Schoorman, 
and Donaldson, 1997; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). That is, a steward’s interests and utility 
motivations are not directed toward personal gains, as is suggested by agency theory, but instead 
toward organizational goals.  “Given a choice between self-serving behavior and pro-
organizational behavior, a steward’s behavior will not depart from the interests of his or her 
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organization” (Davis et al., 1997, pg. 24).  Further, under stewardship theory, employees may 
even have the same motives as the owners of the organization (Davis et al., 1997)
 1
.  
Because stewards can be trusted to behave in ways that are consistent with the interests of 
the owners, the control mechanisms of agency theory may be redundant and inefficient in 
stewardship situations (Barney and Hansen, 1994).  Lee and O’Neill (2003) argued that what 
works well to motivate an agent may not work well to motivate a steward.  Further, some 
researchers have even argued that control mechanisms offered by agency theory are 
counterproductive in steward situations, for the reason that they lower an individual’s motivation, 
undermining pro-organizational behavior (Argyris, 1964; Davis et al., 1997).  
A number of studies have investigated how external rewards affect intrinsic motivation.  
These studies generally found that pay incentives can have a negative effect especially when 
used in jobs that are interesting, creative, and noble (Pink, 2009).  Deci (1971) examined this 
relationship by conducting two laboratory experiments and one field experiment.  He found that 
when money is used as a reward, intrinsic motivation tends to decrease.  Deci et al. (1999) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 128 studies on the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic 
motivation.  These authors found that rewards significantly undermine self-reported interest.  
They argued that while “rewards can control people’s behavior”, they can also “undermine 
people’s taking responsibility for motivating or regulating themselves” (pg. 659).  Last, Pink 
(2009) argued, based on a number of lab studies and the two studies discussed above, that these 
detrimental effects of rewards may be most problematic when “mixing rewards with inherently 
                                                        
1 Compensating differentials is often used in nonprofit compensation studies to explain why nonprofit employees 
are paid less than employees in other sectors (see Hallock, 2000 for additional reasons for differences in pay).  
Whereas compensating differentials can help explain differences in pay levels in nonprofits, it does not help address 
the difference in the pay-for-performance relationship in the nonprofit sector.   
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interesting, creative, or noble tasks- deploying them without understanding the peculiar science 
of motivation- is a very dangerous game.  When used in these situations, “if-then” rewards 
usually do more harm than good” (pg. 49).    
The discussion to this point suggests agents in agency situations will receive pay based 
on performance, whereas stewards in stewardship situations will not be paid based on 
organization performance.  Specifically, in situations where executives’ and owners’ interests are 
closely in common, organizations will not need to align interests.  Additionally, providing 
extrinsic rewards to executives may even prove detrimental to motivation, therefore, no 
relationship between pay and performance is likely to exist in organizations described under 
stewardship theory.  However, a positive and significant relationship is likely to exist in 
organizations described under agency theory.    
Pay-for-Performance in Nonprofits 
Nonprofits are distinct from for-profit corporations for a number of reasons.  First, 
nonprofits have a different bottom line than for-profit organizations (Hallock, 2002).  Second, 
nonprofit organizations are barred from distributing net earnings to individuals who exercise 
control over the organization, known as the “nondistribution” constraint.  This constraint is 
meant to limit the extent to which nonprofits are inclined to cheat their customers and their 
workers (Hansmann, 1996), but it does not prevent nonprofit organizations from offering profit 
sharing or other incentive contracts to their employees (Steinberg, 1990).  Third, nonprofits have 
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tax privileges.  Therefore, nonprofits are free from many tax burdens and donations to them are 
tax deductible
2
. 
Although nonprofits are different from for-profits in a number of ways, nonprofit board 
of directors set the CEO’s pay as well as evaluate the CEO’s performance, a practice similar to 
for-profits.  In addition, these directors must wrestle with many of the same compensation issues 
that face for-profit board directors (Bowen, 2008).   
However, nonprofit organizations do not have owners in the same sense as for-profit 
organizations.  Researchers of nonprofits typically discuss the governing board, which includes 
large donors, as the closest comparison to shareholders in the for-profit sector (Steinberg, 2006)
3
.  
But these nonprofit “owners” do not enjoy the usual rights of ownership.  “Ownership of an asset 
consists of the right to control its use and to enjoy its return” (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995, pg. 532).  
As Steinberg (2006) discussed, nonprofit owners are able to control the use of an asset and 
transfer that control, but are not able to enjoy any profits generated by the organization.  
Therefore, these owners have “attenuated property rights”.  Further, if a nonprofit organization is 
sold or changed to a for-profit firm, then the owners of the nonprofit must donate the fair market 
value of the organization’s assets to another nonprofit.  Essentially, any benefits nonprofit 
owners receive from control of the organization must be nonfinancial
4
.  
 It seems quite clear that the interests of nonprofit executives are more aligned with the 
interests of owners than one would expect in the for-profit sector.  Oster (1995) argued that 
                                                        
2 I am specifically referring to 501c(3) organizations.   
3 Some nonprofit researchers have also argued that members (in the case of membership organizations) and donors 
can be described as quasi-owners of a nonprofit organization (Bowen, 2008).  Donors are an interesting case because 
under the law, donors do not have any claim over the use of the funds they donated, yet nonprofits are likely to pay a 
lot of attention to their donors’ wishes since a nonprofits’ survival is dependent on these funds (Bowen, 2008).   
4
 For example nonprofit owners could enjoy opulent headquarters or board meetings in vacation resorts (Steinberg, 
2006).  
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individuals are drawn to nonprofits for ideological reasons and therefore accept lower wages 
because they are committed to the organization.  This suggests that money is not the main driver 
of behavior for executives
5
, because if it were, executives would pursue opportunities outside the 
nonprofit sector.  Further, Oster (1995) suggested that workers sort into different sectors based 
on their preferences for wages, working conditions, and interest in mission; these differences 
imply that different types of organizations may need to adopt different methods to motivate and 
manage employees.  In addition, Mirvis and Hackett (1983) found that nonprofit employees 
report a stronger commitment to their jobs and also report that their jobs are more important to 
them than employees working in the for-profit sector.   
 This discussion suggests that nonprofits may be better described by stewardship theory; 
however, some researchers have found a positive and significant relationship between pay and 
performance in nonprofit organizations.  Oster (1998) found revenue was a strong predictor of 
nonprofit executive compensation.  Hallock (2002) found a link between total assets and CEO 
pay when examining the determinants of nonprofit CEO pay.  Last, Frumkin and Keating (2010) 
found that nonprofit CEO pay is modestly affected by performance when measured as improved 
fund-raising results or better administrative efficiency.  The results of these studies suggest that 
boards are using pay-for-performance systems to ensure executives are pursuing owners’ 
interests.   
                                                        
5 Or, at least, is not the sole driver.   
 58 
 Agency theory and stewardship theory offer opposing predictions on the relationship 
between pay and performance.  And as the above discussion indicates it is unclear which theory 
offers a better description of nonprofit CEO pay
6
.   
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Organizational performance is positively and significantly related 
to nonprofit CEO total pay. 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Organizational performance is unrelated to nonprofit CEO total 
pay.   
Organizational Factors 
 Certain nonprofit organizations may be more likely to use pay-for-performance systems 
to reward their executives.  That is, there is significant variation in the use of the control 
mechanisms discussed by agency theorists in the nonprofit sector, and organizational 
characteristics may affect the applicability of agency or stewardship theory in these organizations 
where the interests of executives and owners are likely to be aligned
7
.  
Labor market competition. One factor that has led to more regularized methods for 
setting compensation of chief executives in the nonprofit sector is the spillover effect from 
developments in the for-profit sector (Bowen, 2008).  Pay-for-performance is widely used by 
for-profit firms (Milkovich, Newman, and Gerhart, 2011).  I believe nonprofit organizations’ pay 
practices will more closely resemble those found in the for-profit sector when these 
                                                        
6 It is important to note that both agency theory and stewardship theory may be useful to explaining nonprofit CEO 
pay as it may help explain why the relationship is weaker compared to for-profit organizations.  However, these 
theories appear to offer opposing predictions on the relationship between pay and performance so in this study I 
compare these two theories rather than combine them.  
7 Wasserman (2006) examined the applicability of agency versus stewardship theory in new ventures and argued 
that certain situational factors may influence the degree of agency versus stewardship theory.   
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organizations must compete for talent with the for-profit sector. When executives are able to 
move between the for-profit and nonprofit sector, they will bring with them experiences and 
perspectives from the for-profit sector including expectations about how executives are paid.  
Moreover, nonprofit boards are more likely to adopt practices found in for-profit firms in 
organizations where executives move back and forth between sectors to convince talent to come 
work in the nonprofit sector and convince talent to continue working in their organization.   
Sorenson (1999) argued that firms that hire managers from the same labor pool (or from 
each other) exercise very similar strategies.  This happens, as stated by Sorenson (1999), because 
“… as managers move between organizations, they bring with them the knowledge and 
information acquired with their previous employer” (pg. 291).  This facilitates the transfer of 
ideas and therefore creates change because it makes events more concrete and proximate to 
decision makers (Haunschild, 1993).  Further, when decision makers are exposed to greater 
diversity of information, they will be more likely to deviate from the industry norms 
(Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997).  All this suggests that the labor market in which an 
organization competes can affect the strategies and practices it pursues (Sorenson, 1999) and, 
more specifically, may affect how organizations reward their managers (Bertrand, Hallock, and 
Arnould, 2005). 
Additionally, Gardner (2005) examined how firms respond to the loss of employees to 
other firms with a model of interfirm competition for human resources.  He argued that one way 
organizations respond to rivals seeking to hire their employees is through defensive actions, 
which he defined as “… a defensive action is an attempt… to decrease the effectiveness of future 
hiring attempts… without negatively impacting the hiring firm” (pg. 238).  Matching the pay 
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practices of rival firms could be considered a defensive action to ensure that employees do not 
leave the organization for more attractive pay packages in other firms.     
The above information implies that performance, which is found to be an important 
predictor of for-profit CEO pay, is more likely to be an important predictor of CEO pay in 
nonprofit organizations that must compete for talent with for-profit organizations.  Bertrand et al. 
(2005) found support that competition with for-profits increases the pay-performance 
relationship in hospitals.  Specifically, these authors found that as HMO penetration increased, 
defined as the HMO market share by county / year-level, top executives were paid more for 
improving standard economic measures of hospital performance.  Similar to this study on 
hospitals, I expect for-profit competition to increase the link between executive pay and 
organization performance across the nonprofit sector
8
.   
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The relationship between pay and performance will be stronger in 
nonprofit organizations with for-profit competitors.  
Organizational size.  Larger nonprofit organizations may be more likely to adopt pay-
for-performance systems due to these organizations being more formalized, more visible, and 
having more resources.  Smaller organizations are typically described as less complex (Pugh, 
Hickson, and Hinings, 1969) and less formal (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971) than larger 
organizations.  However, as these smaller organizations grow, they are likely to become more 
formal and professional (Blau, 1970; Blau and Scott, 1962).  Wasserman (2006) argued roles 
become more defined and controls are instituted as organizations grow in size in order to 
                                                        
8 It is important to note that although I describe this as labor market competition, I test it using product market 
competition.   
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facilitate organizational activities.  This suggests that the adoption of control mechanisms 
predicted by agency theory may be more applicable to larger nonprofit organizations.  In 
addition, larger nonprofit organizations may be more likely to adopt formal HR workplace 
practices, one important component of which is pay incentives (Colvin, Batt, and Katz, 2001), 
because these organizations are more visible, which may suggest they are more susceptible to 
pressures of legitimacy (Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby, 1986; Jackson and Schuler, 1995).  
Last, larger nonprofit organizations have more resources, which may be necessary in order to 
adopt and implement more sophisticated organizational practices (Jackson and Schuler, 1995).  
 Consistent with the above discussion, many authors have found a positive and significant 
relationship between the use of sophisticated workplace practices and organization size.  Hwang 
and Powell (2009) found nonprofit organizational size is positively related to formal 
organizational practices.  McNabb and Whitfield (1999) found that human resource management 
practices that involve employee participation, including profit-related pay or bonuses and share-
ownership schemes, are more likely to be found in larger organizations.  Last, Lawler, Mohrman, 
and Ledford (1992) found that larger organizations are more likely to adopt employee 
involvement practices.   
Further, some authors have found a greater use of pay incentives in larger for-profit 
organizations.  Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) found that larger organizations (in terms of number 
of employees) are more likely to put more pay at risk with bonuses and long-term incentives.  
McClurg (2001) found that larger firms are more likely to use team rewards than smaller firms.   
Many nonprofit organizations are small compared to for-profit corporations (Stone and 
Brush, 1996; Hallock, 2004).  However, similar to the HR literature and the compensation 
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literature on for-profit firms, I expect larger nonprofit organizations will be more likely to adopt 
pay-for-performance systems and, therefore, a stronger link between pay and performance will 
exist in larger nonprofits. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The relationship between pay and performance will be stronger in 
larger nonprofit organizations.   
Funding diversity.  Funding diversity is another factor that is likely to affect incentive 
schemes in nonprofits.  Nonprofits receive funding from a number of different sources.  
Specifically, Hwang and Powell (2009) argued that a lot variation exists in the degree that 
organizations rely on different types of revenue to fund their missions.  The more funding 
sources, the more constituencies served by a nonprofit. Also, some revenue sources (such as 
noncommercial sources) may specify particular requirements for the funding they provide.  
Stone and Brush (1996) stated, “multiple and often conflicting constituencies strongly influence 
nonprofit organizations” (pg. 634).  They argued that many different groups try to define 
nonprofit goals, and funders are particularly intrusive in these organizations.  Consequently, due 
to these multiple and conflicting goals, nonprofits’ objectives can be difficult to measure (Oster, 
1995; Stone and Brush, 1996).  Therefore, I believe when revenue sources are more evenly 
distributed, there will be more groups that believe they should have a say on how the nonprofit 
operates.  When this happens, performance is likely to become more and more unclear.  When 
organizations do not have a clear idea of what performance is it is hard to tie pay directly to 
performance increases.  Therefore, I expect less pay-for-performance as the distribution of 
funding sources becomes more even, and more pay-for-performance as the distribution of 
funding becomes less even.  
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Hypothesis 4 (H4): The relationship between pay and performance will be stronger in 
nonprofit organizations where funding is more concentrated (or less even). 
Age. Young nonprofit organizations may be more likely to adopt innovative human 
resource (HR) practices including pay incentive schemes.  I believe this is more likely to occur in 
newer nonprofit organizations because it may be harder for older organizations to change their 
management practices or change their organizational culture once these things are established 
and have been in existence for a long period of time.  Additionally, younger organizations may 
be more likely to hire professionals with business experience.  Last, younger organizations may 
be more likely to adopt variable pay systems in particular because these organizations are less 
likely to have the excess resources needed to afford the fixed costs of salaries.   
As discussed above, contingent pay is typically discussed as an essential component of an 
innovative human resources system in the general HR literature.  Researchers in this literature 
have argued that older organizations are less likely to adopt innovative and sophisticated 
workplace practices, including pay-for-performance systems, for a number of reasons 
(Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson, and Strauss, 1996).  First, managers and employees in older 
organizations who may not fare any better under the new system may be resistant to the change 
in practices.  This may be particularly true for pay incentives as it is possible that some 
employees, that is, those that perform poorly, will receive less pay under this new system
9
.  
Baron, Hannan, and Burton (2001) found evidence that employees may not respond well to 
changes in HR systems by finding turnover increased when organizations changed their 
employment model, and this was found to negatively affect subsequent organizational 
                                                        
9 It is important to note though that past research in the for-profit sector has found that, on average, the percentage 
of pay that is variable is actually positively associated with manager pay level (Colvin et al., 2001).   
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performance.  Second, performance has been found to be highest when organizations adopt 
entire systems of HR practices rather than a single practice (Combs, Hall, and Ketchen, 2006).  
Therefore, there will be a need to change an entire system of HR practices if an organization 
chooses to adopt any innovative HR practice, and these practices are likely to be already aligned 
in older organizations.  To change a whole system will require significant time and costs, and 
may even entail switching additional business practices such as technologies, marketing 
strategies, etc.  For these reasons, it is less likely that older organizations will adopt and use 
innovative HR practices.   
Additionally, some authors have argued that younger organizations are more likely to 
hire professional managers and this should affect their use of more sophisticated HR systems.  
Hwang and Powell (2009) found support for the argument that organizational age and formal 
organizational practices
10
 are negatively related, and suggested this occurred because younger 
nonprofits are more likely to employ professional managers which tend to have previous 
experiences in firms outside the nonprofit sector.  Therefore, these professional managers may 
bring with them to the nonprofit organization business practices that were used by their previous 
employers.  
Last, some researchers have specifically argued that younger organizations will be more 
likely to adopt pay-for-performance systems.  Ellig (1981) and Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1987) 
suggested that incentive schemes will play more of a role in growth firms
11
 as this will allow 
these firms to move some of their compensation expenses to a variable expense, essentially 
                                                        
10 Hwang and Powell (2009) specifically looked at organizational rationalization, which they defined as the 
presence of strategic planning, the conduct of an independent financial audit, collection of quantitative data for 
program evaluation, and the use of consultants. 
11 I am assuming growth stage and age are correlated.   
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transferring some of the risk to the employee.  Because newer organizations may not have a lot 
of excess funding built up, the organization will only have to pay employees when they are in the 
financial position to do so.  Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1987) found support that incentive pay is 
greater in firms in the growth stage.   
Following the discussion above, I expect that younger nonprofit organizations will be 
more likely to adopt pay-for-performance systems.  
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The relationship between pay and performance will be stronger in 
younger nonprofit organizations.   
Governance strength.  “It is in exactly the poorly governed firms where we expect CEOs 
to gain control over the pay process” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, pg. 918).  One way 
boards ensure managers are pursuing owners’ interests is through pay-for-performance systems.  
That is, boards tie executive pay to organizational performance to increase the incentive of CEOs 
to maximize the value of the firm.  Similar to for-profits, I expect well-governed nonprofits will 
be more likely to tie CEO pay to organizational performance.   
Stronger boards are believed to have more control over the pay process.  Researchers 
have investigated and found support for this argument by finding that stronger boards tie more of 
their executives’ pay to measures of performance shareholders care about (Gerhart, Rynes, and 
Fulmer, 2009).  Conyon and Peck (1998) examined whether corporate governance positively 
affects the relationship between pay and performance by testing if the relationship between pay 
and performance is larger in organizations with a higher proportion of outside directors on the 
board.  These authors found that management pay and organizational performance are more 
aligned in firms with outsider-dominated boards.  Further, some authors have found a positive 
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relationship between the concentration of institutional investor ownership
12
 and pay-for-
performance (e.g. Hartzell and Starks, 2003), and others have found that the presence of larger 
outside blockholders
13
 is associated with greater pay-for-performance and compensation risk (e.g. 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989).   
Prior research in the for-profit sector has found that size of the board affects governance 
strength, more specifically, larger boards are found to be less effective at governing firms 
(Yermack, 1996).  Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argued that although larger boards have the 
increased capacity to monitor the CEO, smaller boards are actually more effective.   This is 
because coordination and process problems increase as groups increase in size, and these 
problems can overwhelm the benefits of having additional people to draw on (Hackman, 1990).  
Jensen (1993) argued that when boards get too large, they are less likely to function effectively 
and are easier for the CEO to control, stating that this occurs because there is “great emphasis on 
politeness and courtesy at the expense of truth and frankness in boardrooms” (pg. 863).  
Therefore, boards with the more members are more likely to have powerful CEOs who are able 
to use their power to affect the pay process (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).  
Although nonprofit boards are larger than for-profit boards, large nonprofit boards can 
also have drawbacks and can be too big to carry out governance functions (Ostrower and Stone, 
2006).  Similar to for-profit boards, I believe smaller nonprofit boards will be more effective at 
governing nonprofit organizations and therefore will be more likely to adopt pay practices that 
                                                        
12 “Institutional investors are equity holders who file 13F SEC filings and include bank trusts, insurance companies, 
investment companies (mutual funds), investment advisors (brokerage firms), pension funds, and endowments with 
at least $100 million in equity” (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, and Dalton, 2007, pg. 20).   
13
 The baseline for the determination of a blockholder is the 5% equity rule used by the SEC.  However, who is 
included as a blockholder is not consistent across studies (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, and Dalton, 2007).   
 67 
ensure the interests of managers are tied with the interests of owners, that is, pay-for-
performance systems.  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The relationship between pay and performance will be stronger in 
nonprofit organizations with smaller boards.   
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
Based on the previous discussion, my basic empirical model is: 
lnPit = β0 + β1lnRit + β2lnAit + αi + εit      (1)  
where P is total pay of the CEO, R is total revenue, A is total assets, i indexes organizations, t 
indexes time, and (α+ ε) is the composite error term containing temporary and permanent effects.   
Because I am not able to control for all observable and unobservable organizational 
characteristics that may affect the relationship between pay and performance, I included 
organizational fixed-effects in my models.  This allows me to look within organizations, 
controlling for all time-invariant organizational characteristics, to determine how variation in my 
independent variables affects variation in my dependent variable.   
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DATA AND METHODS 
Data  
The data on nonprofit organizations come from tax returns of 501c(3) tax-exempt 
organizations that are required to file Form 990 with the IRS for the years of 1998 to 2003.  I 
defined the CEO as the highest paid officer, director, trustee, and key employee in the 
organization.  I dropped all observations where assets, revenue, and pay are missing or less than 
$1,000 per year and where pay was greater than $10 million per year.  I also deleted 
organizations where number of board members was missing, and I dropped organizations with 
negative values, missing values, or values over one for revenue diversity.  Last, I dropped all 
observations where organization age was missing or less than zero or where industry was 
missing. This resulted in 49,604 organization-years for 13,200 unique nonprofit organizations.  
Due to the selection criteria, the results are more generalizable to larger nonprofits.   
Dependent Measure 
Total compensation.  Total compensation consisted of base compensation (which 
includes salary, fees, bonuses, and severance payments paid), contributions to employee benefit 
plans and deferred compensation, and expense account and other allowances.   
Independent Measure 
Performance.  Performance is defined as current total revenue, as Galaskiewicz, 
Bielefeld, and Dowell (2006) stated, “organizational research has shown that nonprofits are 
driven by resource enhancement” (pg. 340).  Lagged total revenue did not affect the sign and 
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significance of the results, and contemporaneous performance had a stronger relationship with 
CEO pay, therefore I used the current revenue rather than the lagged revenue for each of my 
regressions.   
Controls 
Size.  Size can be measured in a number of different ways in nonprofits.  Following 
Hallock (2002), I measured size as total assets.   
Moderators 
Labor market competition. In this study, I defined labor market competition based on 
whether there are both taxable and tax-exempt firms in the same industry.  An industry was 
coded 1 if taxable and tax-exempt firms coexist, and coded 0 if no taxable competitors exist.  I 
measured this variable in two ways.  First, I used previous studies
14
 (including Rose-Ackerman, 
1996; Leete, 2001; Ruhm and Borkoski, 2003; etc.) and contact with many associations 
representing organizations in the nonprofit sector to identify nonprofit industries where for-profit 
organizations compete.  All industries in the nonprofit sector were included in this first definition 
of labor market competition, and therefore I categorized each industry as either having taxable 
competitors (= 1) or as not having taxable competitors (= 0).  Second, I used IPUMS CPS data
15
 
for January 2003 to identify which industries have both taxable and tax-exempt employers.  To 
do this I found the number of organizations that were listed as “private, for-profit” and  “private, 
nonprofit” in each of the 263 industry codes in the data.  I identified which types of organizations 
                                                        
14 Previous studies that have looked at nonprofit industries with for-profit competitors have focused on explaining 
the nonprofit pay differential, that is, the difference in pay level between for-profit and nonprofit organizations.   
15 Each record in the IPUMS CPS data is a person who reports on the characteristics of their employer.   
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are included in each industry code, e.g. the IPUMS CPS industry code  “scientific research and 
development services” includes all establishments engaged in research in the physical sciences, 
engineering sciences, life sciences, biotechnology field, social sciences, and humanities field, 
and then matched each of these industries to similar industries in the IRS 990 data, that is, using 
the NTEE code.  All nonprofits with any number of for-profits were listed as having for-profit 
competitors
16
.  I dropped any nonprofit industry that did not match an industry in the IPUMS 
CPS data.  See Appendix B for a list of all the industries included in both definitions of this 
variable.   
It is important to note that the second definition of labor market competition, that is, the 
definition based on the IPUMS CPS data, may be problematic because the IPUMS CPS 
categories are fairly broad, and therefore each category includes a variety of different industries.  
That is, a number of different IRS 990 industries are sometimes combined into one broad IPUMS 
CPS category and not all IRS 990 industries listed in this broad category may actually have for-
profit competitors.  For example, zoos and aquariums are grouped together with wildlife 
sanctuaries and bird sanctuaries, and food banks are included with community housing and other 
emergency and relief services.  Because I wanted to base this measure specifically on the IPUMS 
CPS data and not attach any judgment to the categorization of this variable, I included all 
industries grouped into these broad categories under the same coding of this variable.  This 
meant that some nonprofit industries where I don’t believe for-profit competitors exist are 
                                                        
16
 An additional concern with this for-profit competitors variable is that this measure is based strictly on whether any 
for-profit organizations exist rather than the percentage of for-profits in each industry.  For example, only 5% of 
orchestras are for-profit, so it may not make sense to categorize this industry as having for-profit competitors. I was 
unsure what the cutoff should be to define an industry as having both taxable and tax-exempt organizations (that is, 
what portion of an industry that is for-profit would mean nonprofits must compete for talent with for-profits) so at 
this time I decided to define this variable strictly by whether any for-profits exist.   
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categorized as having for-profit competitors (e.g. sanctuaries and food banks are included under 
the industries with for-profit competitors in this second measure)
17
.   
Organizational size.  Again, I defined this variable by total assets.  
Funding diversity. Hwang and Powell (2009) defined diversity of funding sources as 
how evenly or skewed the distribution of revenue is.  These authors discussed how nonprofits 
have three sources of revenue: 1) donations (private), 2) government grants and contracts 
(public), and 3) earned income (market).  I based my measure of revenue diversity on this study.  
This measure is defined as: 
Funding diversity index = [1- ((donations/revenue)
2
 + (govt. grants /revenue)
2
 + (earned 
income/revenue)
2
] x (3/2)   
An organization that draws its revenues evenly from all three sources would score 1.  In 
contrast, an organization that relies exclusively on one source would score 0.  Organizations that 
fall in the middle of this would score between 0 and 1.   
Organizational age.  This was measured as the year of the IRS return minus the year the 
organization was created as a nonprofit. 
Governance strength.  I used number of board members to represent governance strength.  
The larger the board, the less effective they are at governing the firm (Yermack, 1996).    
 
                                                        
17
 To address this, I ran an additional analysis dropping industries where I don’t believe for-profit organizations 
exist.  See footnote 19 below for the results.   
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Analysis 
The data included cross-sectional and panel components.  Although I ran both cross-
sectional and fixed-effects regressions, I focus on the fixed-effects regressions.  To make use of 
the diversity of the nonprofit sector and relax the idea that the relationship between pay and 
performance is consistent across the nonprofit sector, I ran separate fixed-effects regressions 
based on broad industry categories (9 categories
18
).  To examine the effect of labor market 
competition, I calculated separate fixed-effects regressions for nonprofit organizations that 
compete with for-profits and nonprofits that do not compete with for-profits using both 
definitions of the labor market competition variable.  To test the effect of organizational size, 
funding diversity, organization age, and governance on the pay-performance relationship, I first 
interacted each of the continuous contextual variables by performance.  This allows me to 
examine the direct effect of each factor on the correlation between pay and performance.  I then 
created dummy variables defining high and low groups based on the 33
rd
 and 66
th
 percentile, i.e. 
small versus large, non-diverse versus diverse funding, young versus old, and small board versus 
large board, and I ran separate fixed-effects regressions for each group
19
.  When testing the 
dummy moderators, I dropped any organization that changed between low and high (or vice 
versa) across the years
20
, and excluded organizations that fell between the 34
th
 and 66
th
 percentile.  
Previous studies, including Malmendier and Tate (2009), have used this method to examine 
whether a different relationship exists between two variables depending on a third variable as it 
                                                        
18 There is a tenth category of unknown, but no observations were listed in this category.   
19 I also used the median to define high and low groups and the results were very similar.  I present these results in 
appendix C.  Further, I tested the moderators by defining high and low based on initial conditions (first year of data), 
late conditions (last year of data), and without dropping organizations that changed between high and low.  The 
results are very similar.   
20 Due this this, I dropped 29 organization-years for organization size, 1401 organization-years for funding 
diversity, 0 organization-years for age, and 5282 organization-years for board size.   
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ensures that “high” category organizations are only matched to other “high” category 
organizations (and vice versa for “low” organizations).  For example, Malmednier and Tate 
(2009) examined the effect of winning a business award on CEO pay and organizational 
performance based on a firm’s governance structure, where they defined good and bad 
governance using the 33
rd
 and 66
th
 percentile of a governance index. Using this method allows 
me to examine whether the effect of revenue on CEO pay within firms is different for 
organizations classified as “high” compared to organizations classified as “low” for each of my 
contextual variables.  Further, I tested the significance of the difference between the high and 
low groups by interacting the “high” group dummy with each variable included in my model.  I 
looked at the significance of the interaction of the “high” dummy with log revenue to determine 
whether the relationship between CEO pay and organizational performance is significantly 
different between the high and low group.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables of my analysis.  All 
monetary values are converted to 2003 dollars
21
.  On average, nonprofit CEOs make $193,080 in 
total compensation.  The organizations in this study bring in about $63 million dollars in revenue 
and have about $125 million in total assets.  These organizations have a fairly low concentration 
of funding sources, as this averaged about 0.292 on a range of zero to one.  These organizations 
are about 49 years old and have about 23 members on their board of directors.  
                                                        
21 Based on the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U).   
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There are so many different industries within the nonprofit sector, so I also report the 
summary statistics by the broad nonprofit category in table 2.  It is clear that nonprofit CEOs are 
paid very differently across the sector.  Head officers of health organizations are paid the most, 
averaging $291,642, whereas the head officers of religious organizations are paid the least, 
averaging $90,512.  As seen in table 2, both performance and size varies significantly across the 
sector.  Further, all the moderators I examine in this paper vary across the different industry 
categories.  It is clear that there are substantial differences regarding how much nonprofit CEOs 
are paid within the nonprofit sector, and this may suggest that the relationship between pay and 
performance differs depending on the nonprofit industry.   
Table 3 displays the results of testing hypothesis 1a and 1b.  Specifically, in these models, 
I examine whether agency theory or stewardship theory provides a better explanation of 
nonprofit CEO pay.  Agency theory would suggest a positive and significant relationship 
between pay and performance (hypothesis 1a), whereas stewardship theory would suggest no 
relationship (hypothesis 1b).  In model 1, I regressed log total compensation on log revenue and 
controlled for log assets and for year effects.  The coefficient on revenue suggests that pay and 
performance are related.  In model 2, I controlled for broad industry category, in model 3 for 
each of the 26 industries, and in model 4 for the narrowest industry grouping which consists of 
657 industry codes.  In each of these models, it is clear that CEO pay and organizational 
performance are positively and significantly related.  Last, in model 5, I controlled for 
organizational fixed-effects.  Looking at the estimate on revenue, as performance increases by 
10%, the pay of the CEO rises by 0.4%.  This seems small, yet it is still positive and significant
22
.  
                                                        
22 These results do not change when using lagged log revenue instead as organizational performance.   
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Therefore, the results suggest that there is a relationship between pay and performance in 
nonprofits, which lends support for agency theory
23
.   
Because there are a wide variety of organizations within the nonprofit sector, I tested 
whether the relationship between pay and performance differs depending on nonprofit industry; 
table 4 shows these results.  In each regression, I controlled for year effects and organization 
effects.  As can be seen in table 4, it appears that a relationship between pay and performance 
only exists in health and human services organizations.  Specifically, as revenue increases by 
10% in health organizations, the pay of the CEO increases by 0.6%.  Further, as the revenue of a 
human services organization increases by 10%, the pay of the CEO rises by 0.7%.  No 
relationship between pay and revenue exists in any of the other nonprofit industries.  Health and 
human service organizations make up a large number of organizations in the nonprofit sector and 
therefore appear to be driving the positive and significant results in table 3.   Therefore, the 
results in table 4 suggest that stewardship theory may actually provide a better explanation of 
how nonprofit CEOs are paid in most organizations in the nonprofit sector, excluding 
organizations in the health and human services industry
24
.  
In tables 5, 6, and 7, I investigate a number of situational factors that may affect the 
strength of the relationship between pay and performance.  All models included both year effects 
and organization fixed-effects.  In table 5, I investigate hypothesis 2, that is, whether nonprofit 
organizations with taxable competitors have a higher pay-for-performance relationship than 
                                                        
23 It is important to note that even though a positive and significant relationship exists across nonprofit 
organizations, the estimate is much smaller than what is found in the for-profit sector (Hallock, 2002).  
24 In separate analysis, I examined the pay-for-performance relationship of organizations in the health and human 
services category based on finer industry groups.  Again, I find significant variation in the strength of the 
relationship across the industry categories.  See appendix A for results.   
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nonprofit organizations without taxable competitors.  The definition of labor market competition 
in panel A includes all nonprofit industries, whereas the definition in panel B is based on IPUMS 
CPS data and only includes nonprofit organizations whose industry was similar to an industry 
listed in the IPUMS CPS data.  In panel A, I find for organizations with for-profit competitors, as 
revenue increases by 10%, the pay of the CEO increases by about 0.6%.  In organizations 
without for-profit competitors, I find no relationship exists between pay and performance.  In 
panel B, I find similar results.  Results from both panel A and panel B suggest that the strength 
of the relationship between pay and performance is larger in organizations that compete for talent 
with for-profit firms
25
, and further I find these differences are significant.  These results support 
hypothesis 2.   
In table 6, I examine how organization size, funding diversity, organization age, and 
board size directly affect the relationship between CEO pay and performance.  That is, the 
models in table 6 allow me to examine how changes in the moderators affect the pay-
performance link in nonprofits.  I controlled for year effects and organization effects in each 
model.  Column (1) presents the results for hypothesis 3, which predicted the relationship 
between pay and performance would be stronger in larger organizations.  A positive value on the 
interaction between size and revenue would imply that larger nonprofits have greater pay for 
performance.  The results in table 6 however suggest that as organizations get larger, the 
relationship between pay and performance decreases; these results counter hypothesis 3
26
.  
                                                        
25 In an additional analysis using the definition from panel B, I dropped all the industries that I don't believe belong 
in the "industries with taxable competitors" and found stronger support for my hypothesis.  Specifically, the estimate 
on log revenue for organizations with for-profit competitors increases when I dropped nonprofits that don't fit into 
the category of having for-profit competitors but are listed in an IPUMS CPS category that has for-profits.  This 
suggests the relationship may even be stronger for organizations with for-profit competitors than is shown in the 
table.   
26 The size of this effect however appears to be very small.   
 77 
Column (2) displays the impact of diversity of funding sources on the pay-performance 
relationship.  The estimate on the interaction between diversity and log revenue is also negative 
and suggests that as an organization draws its revenue more evenly from all three sources the 
relationship between pay and performance decreases.  These results support hypothesis 4.  
Column (3) investigates age
27
 and column (4) investigates board size on the pay-performance 
link.  Both of these moderators appear to have no effect on the strength of the pay-performance 
relationship
28
.   
In table 7, I broke down each contextual factor into high and low based on the 33
rd
 and 
66
th
 percentile
29
.  I excluded any organizations that switched between high and low groups (or 
vice versa) across the years.  The models in table 7 allow me to examine whether a different pay-
performance relationship exists for organizations categorized as “high” versus organizations 
categorized as “low” based on each organizational level variable.  Similar to table 6, it appears 
that size and funding source affect the relationship between pay and performance as the estimates 
for smaller organizations is stronger than for larger organizations (0.064 compared to 0.044), and 
the estimate for organizations with less diverse funding is stronger than for organizations with 
more diverse funding (0.066 to 0.052).  However, the difference between the pay-performance 
relationship for small and large organizations and organizations with less diverse and more 
diverse funding sources are not significant.  These results seem to suggest that it is the actual 
                                                        
27 The significance and strength of the estimates do not change when the year effects are left out of the model 
investigating age.   
28 Sign and significance of results in table 6 do not change when combining all the moderators into one regression.  
Similar to Wasserman (2006), I compared a baseline model (which included only revenue, assets, and year effects) 
to a model with all the moderators (but again without organizational fixed-effects), and found that the inclusion of 
the moderators increased the R-squared over the baseline model (although the increase was small).   
29 The results are very similar using the median instead of the 33rd and 66th percentile.  Therefore, I do not present 
these results in table 7; however, I include them in appendix C.  Additionally, the results are very similar using 
initial conditions (that is, the first year’s value) and last year’s conditions to define high and low.   
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change within organizations, that is, as nonprofit organizations get larger or smaller and as 
nonprofit organizations increase or decrease their funding diversity, which directly affects the 
strength of the relationship between pay and performance.  
 Looking at the results in table 7 for age and board size, younger nonprofits (compared to 
older nonprofits) and organizations with smaller boards (compared to organizations with larger 
boards) have stronger pay-for-performance systems for their CEOs.  Specifically, as revenue 
increases by 10%, the pay of the CEO increases by 0.53% in younger nonprofits; whereas there 
appears to be no relationship between pay and performance in older nonprofits.  Additionally, as 
revenue increases by 10%, the pay of the CEO increases by 0.75% in nonprofits with smaller 
boards; whereas CEO pay increases by 0.35% for a 10% change in revenue in nonprofits with 
larger boards.  Further, I find these differences are highly significant.  These results support 
hypothesis 5 and 6.  Finding significant effects with the dummy variables instead of the 
continuous moderators suggests that younger nonprofit organizations and nonprofit organizations 
with smaller boards are more likely to have stronger pay-for-performance systems, rather than 
the relationship between pay and performance changing as nonprofits get older or as nonprofits 
increase or decrease their number of board members.   
The results discussed above support hypothesis 2, 4, 5, and 6.  However, I do not find 
support for hypothesis 3. Although I expected to find a stronger relationship between CEO pay 
and organizational performance in larger nonprofit organizations, I find the relationship is 
stronger in smaller nonprofit organizations.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Across the nonprofit sector, I find as performance increases, so does the pay of the 
nonprofit CEO.  However, when I examine pay-for-performance by industry, I find pay increases 
with performance in only a few industries-- the health organizations and human services 
organizations.  This suggests that the results found in previous studies when looking across the 
entire nonprofit sector may have been driven by a few large nonprofit industries.  Therefore, 
stewardship theory appears to provide a better explanation for pay incentives in most 
organizations in the nonprofit sector.  Further, in this study, I find certain situational factors 
affect the strength of the pay-for-performance relationship in nonprofit organizations.  
Specifically, smaller nonprofit organizations, younger nonprofit organizations, nonprofit 
organizations with less diverse funding, nonprofit organizations with stronger boards, and 
nonprofits with for-profit competitors have stronger pay-for-performance systems for their top 
executive. 
Agency theory is widely used to explain executive compensation contracts yet some 
researchers have acknowledged that this theory may not apply to all organizations.  
Organizations where employees are motivated by the organizational goals or missions may 
actually be better explained by stewardship theory.  The results of this study suggest that 
nonprofits are one context where stewardship theory may offer a better description.   
Yet, even in this context, there is variation in the adoption and implementation of control 
mechanisms.  That is, some nonprofit organizations, including organizations outside the health 
and human services industries, are using pay incentives and bonuses to reward their top 
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executives.  For example, I found by examining 2009 IRS 990 forms
30
, that organizations such as 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Greater Los Angeles Zoo Association, the 
YMCA of San Diego, NPR Inc., the Museum of Modern Art, and the Children’s Hospital 
Medical Center all awarded their CEO / Executive Director a bonus or incentive compensation in 
2009.  I name just a few nonprofits here to illustrate the variety of nonprofit organizations 
offering incentive pay.  In addition, the amounts of these payouts vary significantly, and this can 
also be seen in the few examples I listed above.  Whereas NPR Inc. offered their executive 
director $50,000 as a bonus in 2009, the Children’s Hospital offered their CEO $687,209.  The 
other nonprofits fell in the middle: Museum of Modern Art paid $159,000, the Greater Los 
Angeles Zoo paid $75,000, and the YMCA of San Diego paid $377,044 as a bonus.  Further, I 
found that a number of nonprofits in 2009 did not provide a bonus payout but discussed how 
their organization offered pay-for-performance to their executives.  For example, the World 
Wildlife Fund Inc. noted that their board reviews the performance of individuals and relevant 
market data prior to any increases in salary or bonus
31
, and Guide Dog Foundation for the Blind 
Inc. stated, "Annual goals such as increasing organizational revenues are established for the CEO.  
Compensation for the CEO is partially determined by the successful completion of the 
established goals" (IRS 990, 2009, Schedule J, pg. 3).  It is clear from these examples that 
although my results suggest that the relationship between pay and performance is weak or 
nonexistent in many nonprofit organizations, there are some nonprofits that are using these pay 
                                                        
30 IRS 990 forms can be on the National Center for Charitable Statistics website: 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/search.php.   
31 I found this on pg. 85 of their 2009 IRS 990 form.   
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practices to reward their top executive and the amounts and types of practices vary significantly 
across these organizations
32
.  
 Although in this study I find evidence that CEO pay is tied to organizational performance 
in the health and human services industry, there is also variation across these organizations.  In a 
separate analysis, results are displayed in appendix A, I tested the pay-for-performance 
relationship based on finer industry groupings for the health and human services category.  I find 
in the health category, health care (E), mental health and crisis intervention (F), and voluntary 
health associations and medical disciplines (G) have a positive and significant relationship 
between pay and performance.  Medical research (H) is the only industry in the health care 
category that does not appear to link executive pay to total revenue.  In the human services 
category, crime and legal-related (I), recreation and sports (N), and human services organizations 
(P) appear to account for the positive relationship that I find between pay and performance 
across the human services category.  I find no relationship between pay and performance for the 
other organizations grouped into the human services category.  These results suggest that even 
across organizations within the same nonprofit category, there is significant variation in the 
relationship between pay and performance.  
It is interesting to find that age and board size do not directly affect the relationship 
between pay and performance
33
 but, instead, that younger organizations are distinct from older 
organizations and that organizations with smaller boards are distinct from organizations with 
                                                        
32 In many of the IRS 990 forms I looked at, I could not find any evidence of a pay-for-performance system.  
However, it is more difficult to conclude that a nonprofit does not offer pay incentives based on their IRS 990 form 
due to the possibility that an organization offers it but did not pay it out in a given year.  In addition, not every 
organization commented on their pay practices and may have chosen not to discuss their system it in their 990 form 
even if they did had a pay-for-performance system in place.   
33 This may, in part, be due to a functional form issue and in fact suggests that performance should not be specified 
linearly.   
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larger boards.  Moreover, I find that younger nonprofits and nonprofits with smaller boards are 
more likely to have stronger pay-for-performance systems.  It may be less likely to expect that 
changes to the pay-for-performance relationship would occur as nonprofits age a year or as 
nonprofits add an additional board member to their board of directors.  So it makes sense to find 
significant results only when using the dummy variables to represent these moderators.  
Specifically, it may be easier for younger, rather than older, organizations to adopt pay-for-
performance practices (and other innovative HR practices) due to the difficulty of changing 
workplace practices and organizational cultures once they have been established.  Further, 
organizations with smaller boards may be more likely to have adopted pay incentives for their 
executives, rather than incentive practices changing as a board grows or decreases in size.    
 The results regarding the size of the organization are inconsistent with what I expected; 
however, this may be due to a number of reasons.  First, perhaps larger firms have more 
powerful CEOs, and because CEOs are known to be risk averse (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003), 
CEOs with power may be able to influence their boards to tie less of their pay to performance.  
Using this explanation, the results may suggest that as nonprofit organizations get larger, the 
CEO gains more power and is able to influence the board to tie less of his / her pay to 
performance.  Second, smaller firms may have more pay-for-performance because they do not 
have the resources to provide a guaranteed salary to their managers.  Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 
(1987) stated, “Financially, smaller firms are less able to afford fixed cost expenditures.  By 
providing a lower base compensation (which is a significant fixed cost in the short run) in 
exchange for an array of incentive pay programs, smaller companies can buffer themselves 
against short-term financial pressures” (pg. 172).  These authors found that scale is negatively 
related to incentive mix.  Using this explanation, the results on size may suggest that as 
 83 
organizations shrink, they are less able to pay their CEO a fixed salary and therefore increase the 
amount of CEO pay that is tied to organizational goals (and vice versa).  Although I did not 
expect to find a larger relationship between CEO pay and organizational performance in smaller 
organizations, it seems reasonable based on the two explanations offered above.    
Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research 
This study contributes to the compensation literature by enhancing our understanding of 
how organizations compensate their leaders when these leaders may have entered their 
organization for reasons beyond pay.  Specifically nonprofit leaders are described as caring about 
the organizational mission and wanting to help it achieve it’s goals (Rose-Ackerman, 1987), and, 
further, these leaders are thought to care less about money than the traditional compensation 
literature discusses (Hansmann, 1980).  The broader literature on executive compensation tends 
to focus on large publicly traded for-profit organizations, where the interests of managers and 
interests of owners are expected to diverge.  This research ignores that there is likely to be 
convergence of interests in some organizations; and, all organizations likely exist somewhere on 
a continuum between convergence and divergence (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003).  The results from 
my study help to address how organizations pay their executives when executives’ and owners’ 
interests do not diverge as agency theory predicts, and provides reasons why organizations may 
adopt pay incentives even when interests converge.  Future research should examine whether 
certain contextual factors affect the convergence of interests of owners and executives, possibly 
influencing executives’ interests to become less aligned with those of owners.  This would 
provide additional reasons beyond the ones discussed here for the use of pay incentives in 
organizations where it is expected that interests converge.   
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Additionally, this compensation study focuses on a context we know very little about, 
that is, nonprofits.  Approximately 10% of workers are employed in nonprofits (Hallock, 2002), 
hence they are clearly an important part of the economy.  Yet, although thousands of studies 
have been done on executive pay (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), few researchers (exceptions 
include Preston, 1989; Oster, 1995; Hallock, 2000; 2002; Frumkin and Keating, 2010) have 
focused on executive pay practices in nonprofits.  The results from this study suggest that 
executives in nonprofits are paid differently from executives in for-profit organizations.  
However, incentive practices, which are very common in the for-profit sector (Milkovich et al., 
2011), are also used in some nonprofit organizations.  I find certain organizational factors help to 
explain the increased use of these incentives in nonprofits.  
Last, individuals are becoming more concerned about finding jobs that are meaningful 
and rewarding (Michaelson, 2010).  However, it is not clear what role compensation practices 
play in motivating these individuals, as some studies have found that extrinsic rewards can have 
negative effects on individuals’ intrinsic motivations especially when these individuals are 
already motivated. Future research should examine specifically what happens to employee 
motivation, performance, and turnover when employees are motivated by the organizational 
mission and their organizations adopt pay incentives. 
Like all research, this study has some limitations.  First, labor market competition was 
defined by the industry.  Future research should address additional ways to examine labor market 
competition.  Specifically, researchers could better define this variable by asking each nonprofit 
organization whether they compete for talent with for-profit firms.  Additionally, researchers 
could use geographic variation (similar to Davis, Freedman, Lane, McCall, Nestoriak, and Park, 
2009) to investigate how the pay-for-performance relationship changes when a for-profit firm 
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starts a new business near a nonprofit organization (or vice versa).  Second, this study focuses on 
nonprofit organizations so it is unclear whether the results will generalize across organizations.  
Future research should test the moderators proposed here in other organizational sectors.  Third, I 
defined the CEO of each nonprofit by the highest paid officer.  Over 8,700 unique job titles exist 
in the data; therefore, I was unable to use the job titles to define each CEO.  Research on the for-
profit sector have found that only about 81% of CEOs are the highest paid executive in their 
organization (Hallock and Torok, 2010).  Therefore, future studies should sort through and use 
the job titles to examine the CEO pay-for-performance relationship in nonprofits.  Fourth, the 
definition of performance may vary across nonprofit industries, so research should examine 
whether results hold using other measures of performance
34
.   
In addition to what is discussed above, there are a number of directions for future 
research.  Future research should explore how compensation practices differ in nonprofits 
beyond just examining pay-for-performance.  Nonprofits clearly pay less than for-profits 
(Hallock, 2004), and the results from this study suggest that nonprofits are less likely to use pay-
for-performance to reward their executives.  However, in what other ways does compensation 
differ in the nonprofit sector?  Nonprofits are exposed to different environmental factors, which 
suggests that nonprofits may have different constraints and opportunities, compete in different 
labor markets, use different technology, etc. from for-profit firms.  Therefore, nonprofits may 
adopt very different compensation practices from for-profits firms, and further, certain 
compensation practices may be more successful in different organizational sectors.  Future 
research should help reveal how the configuration of compensation practices differs across 
                                                        
34 This is specifically true for the funding diversity moderator as I hypothesized that the mechanism by which 
diversity affects the pay-for-performance relationship is through the addition of other performance metrics in the 
organization.    
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sectors; for example, nonprofits are typically discussed as providing employees with more 
nonfinancial workplace benefits such as work-life balance instead of financial benefits (Hallock, 
2000).  Future research should also help us address which compensation practices are most 
effective in each sector.  Although this study addresses what types of organizations are more 
likely to adopt pay-for-performance practices, it does not address the effect of these systems on 
performance.  We know from previous research in for-profit firms that HR practices in general 
(Batt, 2002) and pay-for-performance systems in particular (Lazear, 2000) have significant 
effects on both organizational-level and individual-level outcomes.  Therefore, additional work 
should be conducted on the effects of pay-for-performance in nonprofits on organizational 
outcomes such as organizational performance or organizational survival, and individual 
outcomes such as attraction, retention, and motivation of nonprofit CEOs and other nonprofit 
executives.  
Conclusion 
Many nonprofits today struggle with attracting and retaining executive talent.  The 
number one reason cited by executives for leaving their nonprofit job is low pay (Bell, Moyers, 
and Wolfred, 2006; Nonprofit HR Solutions, 2012).  Pay-for-performance systems, which are 
highly used in the for-profit sector, appear to be a tool that some nonprofits are using to reward 
their executives when these leaders help the organization achieve its goals.   
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1998-2003
Total compensation 193080
(235701)
[136213]
Revenue 62888683
(230310551)
[13115179]
Assets 124743196
(710692987)
[30686581]
Financing diversity 0.292
(0.301)
[0.171]
Organization age 48.831
(179.334)
[30]
Size of board 23.413
(26.312)
[18]
N 49604
Source: IRS 990 data
   and medians in brackets
Table 1. Summary statistics. Nonprofit CEOs.
a
2003 dollars
b 
Means, standard deviations in paratheses,
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Table 2. Summary statistics. Nonprofit CEOs by broad industry category.
Arts Education Environ/Anim Health Human Serv Internat. Mutual Pub/soc benef. Religion
Total compensation 154763 184740 125360 291642 111795 182032 168092 162545 90512
(153836) (206374) (99186) (320114) (97634) (342899) (232330) (157766) (102457)
[119788] [156310] [102037] [215330] [92602] [156799] [65827] [119140] [66114]
Revenue 16911333 69386495 15819835 122906817 14584597 62941175 34344038 31633209 10439762
42040149 (252018118) (41654033) (331724752) (73965963) (138468702) (94521085) (99835134) (27784529)
[5453756] [20204196] [4818382] [45003120] [5525594] [12843881] [5353441] [7934348] [1845802]
Assets 62215299 237462424 47636277 159606979 27833063 78894418 217880016 117156687 32754054
151268144 (1352319151) (99370981) (453011464) (90975255) (305726777) (805169726) (800727990) (107718487)
[16752621] [51266342] [15711627] [57720344] [9115433] [28423096] [34419852] [29037966] [4171395]
Financing diversity 0.560 0.408 0.452 0.137 0.339 0.295 0.110 0.217 0.235
(0.286) (0.262) (0.307) (0.233) (0.306) (0.295) (0.232) (0.278) (0.274)
[0.651] [0.423] [0.500] [0.021] [0.258] [0.204] [0] [0.070] [0.088]
Organization age 42.980 53.563 46.081 46.965 47.104 24.710 62.355 57.400 56.512
(142.930) (161.263) (167.899) (166.359) (187.917) (18.223) (253.544) (247.474) (253.894)
[31] [43] [30] [31] [26] [20] [24] [21] [20]
Size of the board 31.542 27.817 24.885 21.078 20.327 26.554 14.124 26.054 11.817
(26.515) (24.798) (19.882) (26.605) (22.506) (45.904) (15.115) (33.317) (13.097)
[26] [24] [21] [18] [16] [17] [12] [18] [8]
N 3466 9986 1385 15941 12558 772 121 4475 900
Source: IRS 990 data
b 
Means, standard deviations in paratheses, and medians in brackets 
a
2003 dollars
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(revenue) 0.274*** 0.259*** 0.255*** 0.250*** 0.040***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Ln(assets) 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.054***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Major category effects (10) no yes no no no
Industry effects (26) no no yes no no
Narrow industry effects (657) no no no yes no
Organization effects no no no no yes
Constant 5.979*** 6.195*** 6.143*** 5.999*** 10.356***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.195)
Adj. R
2
0.437 0.443 0.451 0.490 0.776
N 49604 49604 49604 49604 49604
Table 3.  Results of pay-for-performance regression analysis.
Dependent variable: ln(total compensation)
a 
IRS 990 data, 1998-2003
b 
2003 dollars
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Table 4.  Results of pay-for-performance regression by category.  All regressions include organization fixed-effects.
Arts Education Environ/Anim Health Human Serv Internat. Mutual Pub/soc benef. Religion
Ln(revenue) 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.060*** 0.073*** -0.064 0.045 0.029 -0.021
(0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.014) (0.039) (0.074) (0.018) (0.041)
Ln(assets) 0.055* 0.103*** 0.084* 0.067** 0.028 0.159** 0.126 -0.011 0.058
(0.032) (0.029) (0.046) (0.028) (0.017) (0.068) (0.136) (0.034) (0.049)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Organization effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 10.134*** 9.604*** 9.630*** 9.815*** 9.928*** 9.948*** 8.127*** 11.203*** 10.555***
(0.515) (0.504) (0.726) (0.477) (0.291) (1.055) (1.797) (0.540) (0.758)
Adj. R
2
0.836 0.762 0.854 0.670 0.791 0.847 0.954 0.781 0.843
N 3466 9986 1385 15941 12558 772 121 4475 900
Dependent variable: ln(total compensation)
a 
IRS 990 data, 1998-2003
b 
2003 dollars
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Table 5.  Results of fixed-effects analysis by taxable competitors.  
Panel A. All nonprofit organizations.
Taxble competitors No taxable competitors
Ln(revenue) 0.063*** 0.012
c
(0.011) (0.010)
Ln(assets) 0.045*** 0.066***
(0.015) (0.017)
Year effects yes yes
Organization effects yes yes
Constant 9.918*** 10.080***
(0.266) (0.265)
Adj. R
2
0.752 0.806
N 33477 16127
Panel B. Only includes organizations with similar industries to IPUMS-CPS.
Taxble competitors No taxable competitors
Ln(revenue) 0.065*** 0.017
c
(0.011) (0.014)
Ln(assets) 0.036** 0.025
(0.015) (0.026)
Year effects yes yes
Organization effects yes yes
Constant 10.037*** 10.633***
(0.266) (0.415)
Adj. R
2
0.750 0.806
N 33317 6869
c 
Difference is significant
DV: ln(total compensation)
a 
IRS 990 data, 1998-2003
b
 2003 dollars
DV: ln(total compensation)
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Table 6.  Results of fixed-effects analysis with continuous moderators.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(revenue) 0.154*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 0.038***
(0.045) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Ln(assets) 0.151*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.040) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Funding diversity 0.497***
(0.173)
Age 0.063***
(0.002)
Number of board members -0.002
(0.002)
Ln(assets)*Ln(revenue) -0.007**
(0.003)
Funding diversity*Ln(revenue) -0.030***
(0.011)
Age*Ln(revenue) 0.000
(0.000)
Number of board members* 0.000
   Ln(revenue) (0.000)
Year effects yes yes yes yes
Organization effects yes yes yes yes
Constant 8.692*** 10.216*** 7.134*** 10.389***
(0.686) (0.200) (0.197) (0.198)
Adj. R
2
0.776 0.776 0.776 0.776
N 49604 49604 49604 49604
a 
IRS 990 data, 1998-2003
b 
2003 dollars
Dependent variable: ln(total compensation)
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Small orgs Large orgs Nondiverse Diverse Young Old Small board Large board
Ln(revenue) 0.064*** 0.044***
d
0.066*** 0.052***
d
0.053*** 0.004
e
0.075*** 0.035*
e
(0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.018)
Ln(assets) 0.065*** 0.062* 0.036 0.035** 0.044** 0.084*** 0.058*** 0.067**
(0.012) (0.036) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026) (0.017) (0.031)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Organization effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 9.054*** 10.243*** 9.963*** 10.423*** 10.159*** 10.354*** 9.052*** 10.483***
(0.189) (0.645) (0.407) (0.323) (0.285) (0.456) (0.271) (0.537)
Adj. R
2 0.838 0.580 0.777 0.784 0.788 0.713 0.831 0.670
N 16323 16841 15613 16220 16520 16550 14877 13303
c 
All organizations that switched from the low to high moderator group (or vice versa) were dropped 
d 
Difference is not significant 
e 
Difference is significant
Table 7.  Results of fixed-effects analysis with dummy moderators.  
Moderator created with 33rd and 66th percentile.
a 
IRS 990 data, 1998-2003
b
 2003 dollars
DV: ln(total compensation)
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E F G H I J K L M N O P
Ln(revenue) 0.067*** 0.155*** 0.147** -0.143*** 0.201** 0.077 0.130 0.023 0.031 0.211*** 0.003 0.067***
(0.020) (0.052) (0.058) (0.044) (0.087) (0.058) (0.088) (0.033) (0.252) (0.062) (0.044) (0.019)
Ln(assets) 0.062* 0.029 -0.121* 0.267*** 0.349*** -0.029 -0.114 -0.058 0.465** -0.093 0.047 0.025
(0.032) (0.066) (0.072) (0.082) (0.077) (0.075) (0.114) (0.051) (0.230) (0.076) (0.053) (0.022)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Organization effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 9.850*** 8.555*** 11.572*** 9.978*** 2.968** 10.774*** 10.511*** 11.529*** 3.718 9.477*** 10.725*** 10.090***
(0.554) (1.092) (1.149) (1.411) (1.278) (1.151) (2.004) (0.810) (3.307) (1.286) (0.865) (0.388)
Adj. R
2
0.645 0.706 0.878 0.849 0.822 0.831 0.907 0.779 0.757 0.770 0.815 0.776
N 13586 1332 556 467 367 738 218 1499 95 637 850 8154
c 
E: Health Care
  F: Mental Health and Crisis Intervention
  G: Voluntary Health Associations and Medical Disciplines
  H: Medical Research
  I: Crime and Legal-Related
  J: Employment
  K: Food, Agriculture and Nutrition
  L: Housing and Shelter
  M: Public Safety, Disaster Preparedness and Relief
  N: Recreation and Sports
  O: Youth Development
  P: Human Services
Appendix A.  Results of fixed-effects analysis by NTEE industry.
a 
IRS 990 data, 1998-2003
b 
2003 dollars
Dependent variable: ln(total compensation)
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Moderator created with median.  
Small orgs Large orgs Nondiverse Diverse Young Old Small board Large board
Ln(revenue) 0.058*** 0.032**
d
0.063*** 0.040***
e
0.057*** 0.010
f
0.065*** 0.028*
f
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
Ln(assets) 0.064*** 0.048* 0.066*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.081*** 0.053*** 0.087***
(0.012) (0.027) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.026)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Organization effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 9.275*** 10.637*** 9.527*** 10.153*** 9.718*** 10.257*** 9.672*** 9.911***
(0.180) (0.473) (0.364) (0.286) (0.240) (0.361) (0.247) (0.438)
Adj. R
2 0.824 0.619 0.764 0.781 0.788 0.727 0.823 0.680
N 23705 23600 19859 20270 23451 23384 18927 17098
c 
All organizations that switched from the low to high moderator group (or vice versa) were dropped 
d 
P-value test of the difference = 0.097 which is essentially not significant 
e 
Difference is not significant 
f 
Difference is significant
DV: ln(total compensation)
a 
IRS 990 data, 1998-2003
b
 2003 dollars
Appendix C.  Results of fixed-effects analysis with dummy moderators.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CEO PAY: TESTING AGENCY THEORY AND TOURNAMENT 
THEORY IN LABOR UNIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I examine the extent to which two commonly used compensation theories, that is, 
agency theory and tournament theory, help explain the pay of union presidents.  Based on 14,510 
unique international, intermediate, and local labor unions from 2000 to 2007, I find a number of 
characteristics define union presidents’ pay: pay is tied to performance, pay spreads increase 
with level, and pay increases with the management of larger executive teams. Although these 
results support both theories, unexpectedly the evidence suggests that tournament theory 
provides a stronger fit.  This finding, including additional reasons I will discuss, helps to explain 
the mixed results in the executive compensation literature.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  106 
Executive compensation continues to be a controversial issue.  There are at least two 
reasons for this.  First, income inequality is at historic levels (Piketty and Saez 2003).  Second, 
many people believe executive compensation levels are too high.  The central question at the 
heart of the controversy is: do executives deserve their high paychecks?  There are generally two 
sides to the debate.  Some critics (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Kerr and Bettis 1987) argue that 
executive pay is irrational and excessive, whereas defenders of executive pay (e.g. Murphy 1985) 
argue that executives are worth every nickel they make.  Similar to for-profit executive pay, the 
pay of union officers is also a contentious practice, under public scrutiny (French 1992).  Yet, 
although a large literature exists on executive pay in for-profit firms, few researchers have 
focused on the pay of union leaders.  Therefore, it remains unclear how unions compensate their 
leaders and whether union leaders deserve the paychecks they receive.   
 In this study, I ask: what explains union president pay?  Further, are the predictions of 
compensation theories developed to explain for-profit CEO pay applicable to the union setting?  
Last, why are the findings in the compensation literature so mixed?  Substantial research on for-
profit executive pay is based on two theories, that is, agency theory and tournament theory.  
Researchers have generally found that these two theories partially explain the pay of corporate 
executives.  Investigations of agency theory focus on whether pay is based on performance, 
specifically on how executive compensation relates to firm size, profitability, and growth 
(Murphy 1999; O’Reilly et al. 1988).  Economists developed tournament theory to explain the 
structure of pay.  These researchers argue that executive pay can be characterized as competing 
in a tournament in which the CEO wins the top prize (Lazear and Rosen 1981).  Although 
agency theory and tournament theory were initially developed to explain the pay of executives in 
for-profit organizations, people respond to economic incentives regardless of the institution in 
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which they work.  Therefore, the predictions of these two theories can be applied to other groups.  
They have, in fact, already been tested in a variety of different institutions (e.g. see Eisenhardt 
1988 who studied agency theory for retail sales clerks and Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990 who 
tested tournament theory in the 1984 Professional Golf Association tour).   
 I will examine these questions by analyzing compensation data in 14,510 unique 
international, intermediate, and local unions across eight years.  I contribute to the literature in a 
number of ways.  First, I address how leaders are paid in unions.  This is a unique context where 
we know very little regarding executive pay.  Second, I use sophisticated methodological 
techniques, and show that different findings may be obtained when using less rigorous 
approaches.  I believe the discrepancy in results when using different methodological techniques 
helps to explain the mixed findings in the past compensation literature.   
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This paper focuses on two different compensation models: agency theory and tournament 
theory.  These models are rooted in the executive compensation literature and used extensively 
by researchers to address the variation in managerial pay.   
Agency Theory 
Agency theory is the dominant theory used to explain executive pay. In the most basic 
example of agency theory, a firm is composed of two parties, the principal and the agent 
(Holmstrom 1979).  The owner of the organization is the principal whereas the agent is an 
individual who provides the labor.  The problem with agency relationships is that agents do not 
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always act in the best interest of the principal.  To motivate the agent to pursue goals that are 
aligned with the principals, the principal designs a compensation system that links the agent’s 
pay to measures of performance the owner can observe such as return on assets or earnings per 
share (Lambert et al. 1993).  A core hypothesis of agency theory is that CEO compensation 
policies will depend on changes to the principal’s wealth in the company she / he leads (Jensen 
and Murphy 1990).  
 A large literature exists on the determinants of pay for executives with most of this work 
focusing on the for-profit sector (Murphy 1999). O’Reilly et al. (1988), using cross-sectional 
data from 105 Fortune 500 firms, found weak support for agency theory.  Specifically, they 
found performance (measured as return on equity (ROE)) was positively but weakly related to 
CEO compensation.  Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) reported a correlation between ROE and CEO 
cash compensation of 0.13 and ROE and CEO total compensation of  -0.03.   
 Although the results of many past cross-sectional studies suggest that the link between 
executives’ pay and firm performance is weak, by using panel data, some researchers have found 
a substantial relationship between corporate performance and managerial pay (e.g. Murphy 
1985).  This is because panel data allows researchers studying the pay-performance relationship 
to control for the organization with fixed-effects, that is, control for all factors likely to affect pay 
such as industry and “unmeasurables” at the organization-level that do not change over time, and 
therefore specifically examine how changes in performance of an organization affects changes in 
pay of the executive of that organization.  Another way to say this is that this method allows 
researchers to investigate the link between firm performance and CEO pay within organizations 
over time.  Murphy (1985), using panel data from 1964 to 1981, examined executive 
compensation data from the corporate proxy statements of publicly held corporations.  He found 
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corporate performance was strongly and positively related to managerial pay.  Therefore, 
according to this study, by looking within for-profit organizations with panel data, it appears that 
executives are rewarded (or punished) based on firm performance.   
 Some recent research has addressed the compensation of top managers in charitable 
nonprofits.  Hallock (2002) examined the link between performance and managerial pay in 
charitable and religious organizations and found that even controlling for the organization, firm 
size was strongly related to pay
1
.  He also found similar results when looking at the link between 
total revenue and managerial pay.    
 It seems reasonable to expect agency theory will apply to union president pay.  First, 
union members can be thought of as shareholders, where similar to for-profit firms, there is a 
separation of ownership from control.  In unions, members elect officers, thereby delegating 
control of the organization to these officers.  To motivate officers to act in the interest of 
members, members can design compensation systems to link the pay of union officers with 
measures of performance they care about (e.g. members’ wages).  Second, comparable to those 
at the top of for-profit organizations, the top union officers are very visible and typically can be 
characterized as focal people within the organization.  This suggests that union members see top 
officers as having the most influence on things they care about such as wages and benefits and 
that union officials are the easiest people to observe in unions. 
 A number of studies have investigated the pay-performance link of union presidents (e.g. 
Bressler 1972; Ehrenberg and Goldberg 1977; French 1992; French et al. 1983; Sandver 1987; 
                                                        
1 It has been suggested by some researchers (e.g. Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000) that finding firm size 
as a determinant of executive compensation supports the existence of agency problems.  However, Gerhart and 
Rynes (2003) argued, “growth is a desired objective of most owners, not just CEOs” (pg. 143); therefore, it is 
important to note that firm size may actually be considered an appropriate performance measure. 
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Sandver and Heneman 1980); however, all of the studies on union compensation (except one 
study described below) used cross-sectional data and focused exclusively on one union level 
(local or international
2
). Further, only one study, that is, Sandver and Heneman (1980), addressed 
the pay of officers below the president.  These cross-sectional studies indicate that pay and 
performance (including firm size) are positively related in unions.  
 One study investigated the pay-performance relationship at all union levels using panel 
data.  Based on performance measures discussed in the past literature, Hallock and Klein (2009) 
examined the determinants of union presidents’ pay over the years 2000 - 2007.  They found that 
both measures of performance (level of membership and wages of union members) were strongly 
related to the pay of local, intermediate, and international presidents, even after controlling for 
organization fixed-effects and organization size.  Although these authors found a positive and 
significant relationship between firm size and president pay in the cross-section, they did not find 
it was an important determinant when including organization fixed-effects.  In addition, they 
found the elasticity of pay with respect to membership in unions is very similar to the elasticity 
of pay with respect to employees in for-profit organizations.  I base my performance measures 
specifically on the Hallock and Klein (2009) study, but expand on this previous analysis by 
examining the pay systems of the top three officers. 
 To summarize, the literature supports the predictions of agency theory; specifically, as 
stated by Bressler (1972), “Union officials are not unaffected by the agreements they negotiate” 
(pg. 49).  The above studies and the basics of agency theory suggest the following hypotheses:  
                                                        
2 Local unions are defined as the lowest branches of international unions, which typically represent workers in a 
particular plant or geographic area.  International unions are the highest branches of unions with a scope 
representing workers in all states of the United States and Canada.  I also include intermediate unions in my 
analysis.  These unions are the administrative structures situated between locals and internationals and can represent 
workers in a number of geographic districts and a number of industries (Chaison, 2006).   
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Union officers’ compensation will increase with increasing 
membership size. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Union officers’ compensation will increase with increasing average 
member wage. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Union officers’ compensation will increase with increasing assets.   
Tournament Theory 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) proposed tournament theory to explain executive pay 
differentials and to explain the extraordinarily high pay levels of CEOs.  This theory suggests 
that the compensation of the top executive in a corporation may exceed his / her marginal 
product yet be economically efficient.  Lazear and Rosen stated, “On the day that a given 
individual is promoted from vice-president to president, his salary may triple.  It is difficult to 
argue that his skills tripled in that one-day period, presenting difficulties for standard theory… It 
is not a puzzle, however, when interpreted in the context of a prize” (Lazear and Rosen 1981: 
847). Organizations consider the tournament scheme efficient because the extraordinary top prize 
acts as an incentive to those lower down the corporate hierarchy (Main et al. 1993). In essence, 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) argued that organizations do not pay CEOs so much because the CEO 
is worth that much, but rather the CEO wage is higher than his / her marginal product in order to 
induce all other employees in the organization to work harder in competition for the top prize 
(Gerhart and Rynes 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2010). 
 Several important features characterize tournament structures (Gerhart and Rynes 2003).  
First, organizations set prizes before the tournament begins and organizations award prizes based 
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on rank-order; therefore pay is tied to the job rather than the individual.  Second, the absolute 
spread between the payoffs for each rank should affect the motivation and effort of those 
participating in the tournament; therefore larger gaps between levels motivate lower-ranked 
employees, and as one moves up the organizational hierarchy, the gaps between levels get larger.  
Also, due to the decline in promotion possibilities as one moves up the organization, the pay 
growth is larger to preserve the expected value of promotion.  Last, at the senior management 
level, those competing to become CEO can be thought of as competing in a tournament; as the 
number of vice presidents (that is, one level below the top) increase, so should CEO pay and the 
gap between the CEO and the next level because more individuals are in competition for the top 
spot (Lazear and Rosen 1981).  This is because as the number of vice presidents increase, the 
chance of winning the one top spot decreases.  The extra pay is therefore used to as an incentive 
to persuade VPs to compete although their chances of winning have decreased. 
 While the predictions of tournament theory are clear, the empirical evidence in support of 
these predictions is quite mixed.  Some studies have found support for tournament theory.  For 
example, Leonard (1990) studied large U.S. corporations between 1981 to 1985 and found that 
pay differentials were greater as one moved up the hierarchical ladder and also when the 
promotion rate was lower.  Both findings are consistent with the propositions of tournament 
theory. It is important to note that this test of tournament theory, that is, testing the differentials 
between levels, can be examined with cross-sectional data.  This is because this test does not 
require any change in organizational variables such as the number of vice presidents (VPs) or 
performance.  However, as I argue below, the second test of tournament theory (that is, how 
number of VPs affects the CEO pay) should be tested with longitudinal data.  Main et al. (1993) 
examined executive compensation over a 5-year period and also found support for tournament 
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theory.  Specifically, they found that size of the prize received at promotion was positively 
related to the number of contestants and that rewards increased with promotions to the highest 
levels of the corporation.  Bognanno (2001) tracked individual executives at more than 600 for-
profit firms for up to 8 years and, controlling for executive and firm-level variables, found that 
CEO pay and the difference in pay between the CEO and average VP rose as the number of 
competitors increased. 
 Although some studies provide support for the tournament model, a number of 
researchers have found results that are inconsistent with tournament theory.  O’Reilly et al. 
(1988) examined pay data in a cross-section of 105 Fortune 500 firms and failed to find a 
positive relationship between CEO pay and number of VPs.  Hallock (2002) examined 
tournament theory in nonprofits by suggesting that board members may be contestants 
competing for the top position.  He examined how the number of board members affects the pay 
of the top executive and found that the larger the board, the less the top officer, director, or 
trustee was paid.  This was true even when controlling for industry and organization fixed-
effects.  Last, Henderson and Fredrickson (2001) examined how the number of VPs affected the 
pay gap between the CEO and the average pay of the other top management team members.  
Using cross-sectional data, these authors found a negative relationship between number of vice 
presidents and the CEO pay gap.   
 It is clear that the results regarding whether tournaments exist in organizations is 
inconsistent.  These mixed findings may be due to the way in which different researchers have 
tested tournament theory. Specifically, I focus on whether researchers use a cross-sectional or 
longitudinal dataset, as this may lead to different conclusions.  Further, researchers have 
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operationalized the CEO prize in a number of different ways, which is also likely to lead to 
different results.   
 Similar to for-profit organizations, leaders of labor unions generally move up to the top 
of the organization by moving through the ranks (Dunlop 1990).  Dunlop (1990) argued that in 
business organizations, promotion is the most common route to the executive ranks.  Further, he 
contended that union leaders come almost exclusively from their members and have a well-
defined ladder that leads to the president position.  This suggests that there is a clear path that 
must be followed to reach the top executive position in both the for-profit and union sector, a 
structure consistent with a tournament pay scheme.  Therefore, although tournament theory was 
developed to explain executive pay in the for-profit sector, tournament theory may also apply in 
the union sector.   
 The above discussion suggests two hypotheses concerning tournaments in labor unions:  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The pay difference between levels will increase as one moves up the 
organizational hierarchy at the executive level.   
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): After controlling for standard economic determinants, as the 
number of officers increases so will the prize of moving from the second to top officer. 
Agency and Tournament Theory 
Although agency and tournament theory are similar in that both theories provide 
arguments that more pay reduces the need for supervision and provides stronger incentives that 
better align principal-agent interests (Henderson and Frederickson 2001), these two theories 
differ in a number of important ways.  First, tournament theory assumes that the pay of an 
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executive can exceed his / her marginal product whereas agency theory assumes that the pay of 
an executive is equal to his / her marginal product.  Second, pay in tournament theory is based on 
one’s rank in a hierarchy, where rank is determined by relative performance (that is, 
organizations evaluate employees’ performance relative to their peers).  However, agency theory 
provides the argument that higher performance should lead to higher pay; therefore absolute 
performance is what is important in this theoretical perspective.  Last, as described above, in 
tournament theory, organizations with more VPs offer higher CEO pay because with additional 
VPs there is more competition for the top spot, and higher pay will provide incentives for 
individuals to want to compete. However, agency theory suggests that after controlling for 
changes in performance or changes in firm size, more VPs will be associated with either lower 
CEO pay or should have no effect on CEO pay.  A negative effect on CEO pay can be expected 
under agency theory for two reasons.  First, more VPs may be additional monitors within 
organizations; therefore, with more people watching the CEO, the possibility of whistle blowing 
increases.  Since monitoring and incentives are substitutes under agency theory (Zajac and 
Westphal 1994), with more monitoring, there is less of a need for a highly paid CEO (Hallock 
2002).  Second, once any changes in performance and size are controlled for (that is, the size and 
complexity of a firm is given), a larger number of VPs means that more people share the work, 
which reduces the job demand of the CEO.  Therefore, this would suggest a reduction in the 
CEO’s pay.  However, at the very least, we should expect under agency theory that increasing 
the number of VPs should not affect the CEO’s pay.  Gerhart and Rynes (2003) stated “…if 
agency theory is correct, executives should be rewarded primarily for performance, as indicated 
by measures such as profitability and shareholder returns (Hallock and Murphy 1999)” (pg. 142). 
In agency theory, extra VPs affect CEO pay only via firm performance.  Thus an estimation 
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model including firm performance should reveal no additional contribution from the number of 
VPs in explaining the variance of CEO pay.  Although tournament theory provides the argument 
that more VPs is correlated with higher CEO pay, agency theory suggests that more VPs is 
correlated with lower CEO pay or is not correlated with CEO pay at all.   
 The above discussion indicates a number of competing hypotheses between the two 
theories.  However, in my data I am specifically able to address the hypotheses of how the 
number of VPs affects CEO pay (that is, in the union context, how the number of officers affects 
union president pay).  Therefore, agency theory offers a competing prediction to H5a:  
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): After controlling for standard economic determinants, increasing the 
number of officers should have no effect or should be negatively related to the prize of moving 
from second to top officer. 
Executive Pay in the Union Sector 
 Although both agency theory and tournament theory are likely to be applicable to the 
union setting, it may be the case that it is more likely when comparing these explanations 
simultaneously to expect that agency theory will provide a better explanation for the pay of the 
top officer.  As seen in past studies (see Hallock and Klein 2009), the performance measures 
focused on in union studies may have a more direct link to members than would be expected 
from the traditional performance measures studied in for-profit organizations (such as profits, 
return on assets, etc.).  Specifically, the variation of union presidents’ pay explained by 
performance is around 55% to 65% in the cross-section (Hallock and Klein 2009), while the 
variation of pay explained by performance in for-profit firms is often substantially smaller rarely 
exceeding 15% (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2010).  In addition, tournament theory appears less likely as 
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an explanation for the pay of the top union officer due to both the consensus ideology (Kochan et 
al. 1994) of these organizations and the expectation by union members that everyone should be 
paid about the same.  Main et al. (1993) found in for-profit firms that the difference in pay 
increased by 83% when moving from level 3 to level 2, and 142% when moving from level 2 to 
level 1.  These are large differentials between levels as one moves up the organizational 
hierarchy, and are likely to be much smaller in the union setting due to more of an emphasis 
placed on internal equity (Dunlop 1990).  For these reasons, although I expect both theories to 
help explain the pay of union top officers, when I compare both theories simultaneously, agency 
theory should provide a better explanation for how the top officer is paid. 
 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 Based on the discussion to this point including previous studies on the determinants of 
union officers’ pay, my basic empirical model is:  
 lnPit = 1lnMit + 2lnWit + 3lnAit + 4Oit + i + it  (1) 
where P is the gross salary of the top officer of the labor union
3
, M is the total membership in the 
labor union, W is the average wage of union members, A is the total assets of the labor unions, O 
is the number of officers, and (i + it) is the composite error term containing possible permanent 
effects.  The subscripts i and t represent organizations and time, respectively.    
In my analysis, I use organizational fixed-effects to control for all observable and 
unobservable organizational characteristics that are time-invariant.  Organizational fixed-effects 
                                                        
3 I am operating under the assumption that union leaders are primarily paid in cash, with a set of common benefits 
that are correlated with cash compensation.   
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estimation uses information strictly on changes within the organization in estimating the effects 
of my independent variables on my dependent variable.  Including organization fixed-effects 
allows me to look within an organization to determine how the variation of the independent 
variables (e.g. performance or number of officers) affects the variation of the dependent variable 
(that is, base salary).  If I assume that the source of endogeneity arises only through the 
permanent component of the error term, i, and not the transitory component, it, then the 
standard fixed-effects estimation of equation (1) will yield consistent estimates of the parameters 
(Hallock and Klein 2009).  
 In the past, researchers testing tournament theory have operationalized the dependent 
variable for the CEO prize in a number of ways.  To help address and explain the inconsistent 
findings in this literature, I test my hypotheses with a variety of different dependent variables 
used in past research.    
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 For this analysis, I use data from LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 reports.  These reports are filed 
by each labor organization subject to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
(LMRDA), the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), and the Foreign Service Act (FSA) from 2000 
– 2007.  These laws cover labor organizations that represent employees who work in the private 
sector, employees who work for the U.S. Postal Service, and most employees who work for the 
Federal government.  Union organizations that represent workers who only work for the state, 
the county, or the municipal government are excluded from these laws and therefore are not 
required to file these forms.  The forms contain a common set of information for all labor unions; 
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however, in this analysis I focus on a subset of this information.  I categorize labor unions as 
“International,” “Intermediate” or “Local” based on the United States Department of Labor 
Office of Labor-Management Standards’ classification, and define the top three officers as the 
three highest paid officers in each union.  In all, I study 207,897 observations (person-years) of 
data for 14,510 unique organizations. This represents 73 unique international unions, 742 unique 
intermediate unions, and 13,695 unique local unions.   
  Table 1 displays the summary statistics for each level of union.  By looking at 
international unions, it is clear that the average compensation for the top officer is $155,937, with 
a median of $121,883.  The average compensation for the second officer is $120,215, with a 
median of $104,964.  And the average compensation for the third officer is $104,815, with a 
median of $97,719.  The average international union has 115,882 members.  The median number 
of members is much smaller (14,646) due to the fact that some of the international unions are so 
large.  The average level of assets for the international unions is $39 million and the annual dues 
are $18.6 million.   
  Based on Hallock and Klein (2009), I also created an estimate of the average union 
member wage: 
     W = (D/0.015)/M,  (2) 
 where D = annual dues of the union, M is union membership, and I assume that 1.5% of the 
union member’s pay is contributed to the labor union as dues4.  Using the formula in equation (2), 
I estimated that the average member of an international labor union during this time earned 
                                                        
4 Raisian (1983) suggests that between 1.13% and 1.6% of union member’s wage are paid in dues.  Results do not 
substantially differ when using the min (1.13%) or max (1.6%) instead of 1.5% to calculate the average member 
wage.   
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$44,034.  Table 1 also reports summary statistics for intermediate and local labor unions.  
Clearly, there are substantially more union-years of data in my intermediate sample (9,651) than 
international sample (1,065).  There are still more observations in my local sample (197,181).  
The tables clearly show that local unions pay their top three officers significantly less than and 
are smaller than intermediate unions, which are substantially smaller than international unions.  
However, the estimate for the average wage of intermediate union members is substantially 
higher than the average member wage of locals and internationals.  This may be due to the fact 
that this number is an estimate, and that there are small numbers for members in the intermediate 
unions.  One other issue evident in this study is that this analysis is based on the top three highest-
paid officers, so only unions with three or more officers were included in the sample.  Because 
some small unions have fewer than three officers, my sample is somewhat distinctive as it is 
comprised only of larger unions
5
.   
 
RESULTS 
Is There Evidence in Support of Agency Theory? (H1-H3) 
Tables 2a – 2c present the regression results of the determinants of pay for the top three 
officers in international, intermediate, and local unions. For each model (columns 1-3), I regress 
the natural logarithm of salary of each one of the top three union officers (column 1 is top 
officer, column 2 is second officer, and column 3 is the third officer) on performance (which is 
                                                        
5 When including observations for all unions (that is, not imposing the restriction of having at least three officers), I 
find smaller means and medians for all variables included in our analyses.  So, I reran each regression including all 
observations.  I generally do not find a difference in significance or sign from the results presented in this paper; 
however, in some cases the strength of the coefficients change.  I present the results of only unions with three or 
more officers because I believe this is a more conservative test of my hypotheses.   
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measured as the number of members and estimated average member wage) and firm size (which 
is measured by total assets), controlling for year (to control for differences over time) and for the 
union with organization fixed-effects.   
 Because different unions could have unmeasured characteristics that I may want to 
consider, including organization fixed-effects allows me to examine the relationship between 
variation in each performance measure and variation in the salary of union officer within each 
union.  I only present the models for the longitudinal analyses for each of these tests as I found, 
following numerous other researchers (e.g. Liu and Batt 2007; Murphy 1985), specifications that 
exclude organization fixed-effects may be misleading.   
 Looking specifically by type of union, Table 2a displays the results of an examination of 
H1-H3 for only international unions.   In column 1, I regress the salary of the top union officer 
on membership, average member wage, assets, and controls for the year and the organization.  
The coefficient on membership and average member wage are both positive and significant.  
This suggests that international unions link pay and performance, that is, as membership size and 
average member wage increase, so does the pay of the international union president.   
 It is important to note, similar to Hallock and Klein (2009), I found different results for 
what affects top officer’s pay in the cross-section (see Appendices 1-4 for results from the cross-
sectional and longitudinal analyses).  In the cross-section, when looking across organizations, it 
appears that average member wage and total assets are what matters to top officer’s pay which 
would suggest that larger unions and unions with higher average member wages pay their 
presidents more.  However, once I control for the organization, and specifically look within 
unions, I see that membership size and average member wage are important determinants of 
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president pay.  This means that as membership size and as average member wage increase, the 
pay of the top union officer also increases.  Whereas the cross-sectional results reveal total assets 
as an important determinant, the panel data results do not reveal this as an important determinant 
but instead indicate that membership size is important.  I find similar differences between the 
cross-sectional results and longitudinal results across my analysis.  Previous work on executive 
compensation has shown that due to the omission of important variables, cross-sectional results 
may be biased and misleading.  Murphy (1985) states, “Economic theories of efficient 
compensation suggest that, in addition to current performance, contracts will depend on other 
factors such as entrepreneurial ability, managerial responsibility, firm size, and past 
performance.  Absent a theory indicating the relevant variables and data on these variables, these 
cross-sectional models are inherently subject to serious omitted variables problems” (pg. 12).  If 
I assume that these omitted variables are unchanging over time, then including firm fixed-effects 
allows me to assess correctly the relationship between pay and performance. I believe the 
estimates from the specification with firm fixed-effects are the least biased and therefore only 
discuss the findings from analyses including fixed-effects and further, base my main conclusions 
on these specifications.    
 I do the same analysis for the second officer and third officer of international unions.  I 
report these results in column 2 (second officer) and column 3 (third officer) of Table 2a. By 
looking at the panel data results, it appears that average member wage matters for both officers, 
but membership only matters for the second officer.  In general, the results discussed above 
indicate that in international unions as membership and average member wage increases, so does 
the pay of the top three officers.   
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 Table 2b displays the analysis for the compensation of the top three officers of 
intermediate unions, and Table 2c displays the results for local unions officers.  As seen in both 
tables in columns 1 - 3, both increasing membership and increasing average member wage are 
correlated with increasing pay for all three officers.   
 Therefore, in this analysis I find in almost all specifications, ln(membership) and 
ln(average member wage) are positive and significant.  These results suggest that within 
international, intermediate, and local unions, as performance increases, the pay of union officers 
also increases.  These results provide support for H1 and H2, the associations that agency theory 
predicts.  Therefore it appears that agency theory provides a useful explanation of executive pay 
in unions. 
Is There Evidence in Support of Tournament Theory?  
As discussed above, there are inconsistent results regarding whether tournaments exist in 
organizations.  Some researchers have found support for tournament theory, whereas other 
researchers have not found support for tournament theory.  Part of this discrepancy in findings 
could be due to the variety of methods that researchers have used to test tournament theory’s 
propositions.  Therefore, in this analysis, I employ multiple methods used in previous studies to 
test the predictions of tournament theory.  Further, I explain below which method I believe is 
most appropriate and show why empirically.   
(a) Pay difference between levels (H4).  Table 3 displays the results of the differences in pay 
as one moves up the organizational hierarchy for each union type (H4).  I performed this test of 
tournament theory by computing the ratio of the difference in pay between levels over the pay of 
the lower level by each union.  The ratios are thereby calculated within each organization.  
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Specifically, I use the medians to test this hypothesis since the mean can be highly influenced by 
a few unions offering extremely large pay increases.  This analysis is similar to analyses done in 
the for-profit sector (e.g. Conyon et al. 2001; Leonard 1990).  Generally, researchers examining 
the pay difference in the for-profit sector have found that pay spreads increased with level, 
therefore providing support for tournament theory.  I find the difference between the first and 
second level is generally larger than the difference between the second and third level. The 
results from Table 3 are consistent with the idea that tournaments are operating in unions.  
(b) Agency theory or tournament theory? Number of officers and union president pay 
(H5a and H5b).  Because I find support for both agency theory and tournament theory, I am able 
to test the conflicting prediction of how the number of officers affects CEO pay.  Table 4 
displays the results for H5 for local, intermediate, and international unions.  Specifically, I test 
whether the number of officers has a positive, negative, or no effect on the pay of the top officer 
and the gap between the first and second officer.  Similar to Hallock (2002), panel A displays the 
results of the regression of the log of top officer pay on number of officers, log of membership, 
log of average member wage, and log of assets.  Panel B displays the results of the regression of 
the log of the salary of the top officer minus the log of the salary of the second officer on number 
of officers and the performance and firm size variables, as Conyon et al. (2001) discussed that 
this is the general procedure used by many authors including Main et al. (1993).  Last, similar to 
O’Reilly et al. (1988), panel C displays the results of the log of top officer pay on number of 
officers, log of the salary for second officer, log of membership, log of average member wage, 
and log of assets.  In each of these tests of tournament theory, I control for year effects and 
control for organization effects.   
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 It is important to note in Table 4, that the coefficient on number of officers in the cross-
section is often negative; however, in most cases once I control for organization fixed-effects, the 
coefficient becomes positive (see Appendix 4).  These results suggest that past analyses of 
tournament theory using cross-sectional data may be misleading and biased, and further suggest 
why there are inconsistent findings when examining this second test of tournament theory in the 
literature.  Therefore, I again only discuss results based on specifications with organization 
fixed-effects.  
 From the regression of salary of top officer on number of officers, panel A, columns 1 - 
3, I find that once I control for performance and size, that the coefficient on number of officers is 
both positive and significant which suggests that as the number of union officers increase, unions 
increase the pay of their top officer.  Panel B displays the results when regressing the log of the 
gross salary of the first officer minus the log of the gross salary of the second officer.  Once I 
control for performance and size, I find the coefficient on number of officers is negative but not 
significant for internationals, positive and not significant for intermediates, and negative and 
significant for locals.  Using this test, it does not appear that tournaments are operating in unions.  
Panel C displays the results of the regression of top officers’ salary on number of officers and 
salary of second officer. As can be seen, when looking strictly at how the number of officers 
within each union affects pay of their top officer, I find the coefficient is positive in all union 
types and also significant for intermediate and local unions.  This appears to indicate that at least 
in intermediate and local unions, even when controlling for other determinants of top officer pay, 
as the number of officers increases, so does the pay of the top officer.   
 Considering the different results found by each test, what can we make of these findings?  
Examining the organization fixed-effects regressions of panels A and C of Table 4, I generally 
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find similar results.  Both indicate that when looking within a firm, adding an extra officer 
increases the pay of the top officer.  Both of these tests provide support for tournament theory.  
However, the models of panel B appear to indicate that the number of officers does not affect 
pay, except in local unions (in which case it is negatively affected).  This test of tournament 
theory, although used in previous analyses, may be misspecified as explained below.  The 
specification for Table 4 panel B is equation (3), and the specification for Table 4 panel C is 
equation (4): 
lnP1it – lnP2it = 1lnMit + 2lnWit + 3lnAit + 4Oit + i + it  (3) 
lnP1it = 5lnMit + 6lnWit + 7lnAit + 8Oit + 9lnP2it + i + it  (4)  
where, similar to equation (1) above, P is the gross salary of the top officer of the labor union, M 
is the total membership in the labor unions, W is the average wage of union members, A is the 
total assets of the labor unions, O is the number of officers, and (i + it) is the composite error 
term containing possible permanent effects.  However, in equation (3) and equation (4), I add 
lnP2it; P2 is the gross salary of the second officer of the labor union.  Again, the subscripts i and t 
represent organizations and time, respectively.    
 Equation (3) is equation (4) under the assumption that B9 equals one. To test whether this 
assumption is correct, I ran t-tests for B9 = 1 in equation (4).  In all union types, I reject the 
hypothesis that B9 = 1; therefore equation (3), panel B, is misspecified. Therefore, I base my 
conclusions on whether tournaments exist in unions on the findings from the tests displayed in 
panel A and panel C.  These findings suggest that as a union increases its number of officers, the 
pay of the top officer and pay gap between the first and second officer increases.  Therefore, 
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when testing the competing prediction of agency theory and tournament theory, my results 
provide support for tournament theory.    
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Although there is a considerable body of research examining the compensation of 
executives in for-profit firms (Murphy 1999), there are relatively few studies that address the pay 
of union leaders.  Further, the findings in the for-profit executive pay literature are mixed and 
inconsistent (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2010).  I address these issues in this paper.   
 My results support the importance of both agency theory and tournament theory for 
explaining the pay of leaders in American labor unions.  I find evidence that pay and 
performance are linked in unions, supporting agency theory.  Further, I find evidence that as 
officers move up within a union, the pay difference between levels increases supporting 
tournament theory.  Both tournament theory and agency theory appear to be useful explanations 
for explaining union president pay.   
 Finding support for both theories in unions, I am able to test these theories 
simultaneously and address the competing prediction.  By including propositions from both 
models, I examine the effect of changes in the number of officers on union president pay once I 
control for changes in performance.  By only focusing on models that include organization fixed-
effects, I generally find that the coefficients on number of officers are positive and significant.  
This test of both theories supports tournament theory and therefore tournament theory appears to 
offer a better account of the pay of the top officer.   
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 Although I use data from American labor unions to test my hypotheses, I believe the 
results pertain to the larger literature on executive pay and provide insight into the mixed 
findings in past studies.  I believe the stronger evidence for tournament theory may suggest that 
the current conceptualization of agency theory fails to address the importance of managing more 
vice presidents, that is, the increase in coordination and integration costs that comes with having 
a larger team.  If CEOs have to manage the relationships among VPs, then the number of 
relationships increase as the number of VPs increase.   
 Larger groups are more difficult to coordinate and integrate (Gooding and Wagner 1985; 
Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993), therefore by adding more VPs to an executive team, the job of a 
CEO may become more complex (Henderson and Fredrickson 2001).  Levine and Moreland 
(1990) stated, “as groups get larger, it also changes in other ways, generally for the worse” (pg. 
593).  They argued that individuals belonging to larger groups are less satisfied, participate less 
in group activities, are less likely to cooperate with one another, and are more likely to 
misbehave than individuals in smaller groups.  Further, they contended that the larger groups 
suffer coordination problems and motivation losses, which prevent them from achieving their 
potential.  In addition, Gooding and Wagner (1985) suggested that as groups grow in size, group 
members have an increasing inclination to free-ride.  Finally, it is clear that larger groups take 
longer to make decisions and reach agreements (Thomas and Fink 1963).  Therefore, due to all 
these reasons, CEOs may have to work harder as executive teams grow in order to integrate 
members and coordinate interests within the group.   
 The increase in coordination and integration costs that comes from managing larger 
teams may help to explain why I find adding additional members to an executive team has a 
positive effect on the pay of the top officer, even when controlling for changes in firm size and 
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performance.  It appears that organizations recognize this increase in complexity and provide 
their CEOs with additional pay to compensate their top manager.  To be clear, though I am not 
saying that either theory is wrong, my findings may suggest that agency theory’s prediction 
about the effects of additional executive team members, that is, that extra vice presidents should 
only affect CEO pay via firm performance or should have a negative effect on CEO pay, is not 
supported.   
 Finding stronger support for tournament theory in unions is surprising, as it appears 
reasonable to expect agency theory to have a stronger effect in this setting.  I expected to find 
stronger support for agency theory when testing the contradicting propositions of agency and 
tournament theory simultaneously in the union setting; however, my results support tournament 
theory.  These findings therefore provide stronger evidence for the importance of number of vice 
presidents as a determinant of CEO pay in other settings. 
 My results are most in line with Bognanno (2001) who found, even after controlling for 
executive and firm variables, that increasing the number of competitors increased the CEO prize 
in for-profit firms.  It is important to note that Bognanno (2001) included in his models a number 
of variables that could be considered performance variables, e.g. net sales and total employment.  
Therefore, even controlling for performance, he still found a positive and significant relationship 
between number of vice presidents and CEO pay.  Further, this relationship remained positive 
and significant even when including individual and firm fixed-effects.  Although my study was 
conducted in the unique setting of unions, it is clear that my results are similar to those found in 
for-profit organizations.  
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Limitations 
First, I use the pay data to define the level of the officer.  Although the titles related to 
president and general chairman were listed more frequently than any other job title listed for the 
top officer, over 4,779 unique job titles exist in the data.  Therefore, I was unable to use the job 
titles to define each officer.  Second, it is possible that the number of officers included in this 
study is not large enough.  Chaison (2006) discussed how unions (even locals) generally have at 
least a president, secretary-treasurer, and a vice president, although this may not be true of some 
very small unions.  Because I expected unions to have at least these top three officers and all of 
my hypotheses required at least three to be conducted, I chose to focus my analysis on the top 
three officers versus the top four or five officers.  Third, although these theories are embedded in 
the executive compensation literature, it is possible that the theories included are wrong or that 
other theories used in the compensation literature may provide better explanations for the pay of 
union officers.  Future research should evaluate the ability of other theories, for example human 
capital theory (Becker 1975; Mincer 1974), to explain union officer pay.  Last, although Hallock 
and Klein (2009) found evidence that the performance variables included in this analysis matter 
to the pay of union officers, it is possible that other performance measures also matter. For 
example, average total compensation for members (including pensions, benefits, etc.) might be a 
better measure of union member compensation than base salary.  In addition, other factors such 
as number of strikes, policy outcomes, industry membership, etc., are clearly important to union 
members and may affect the pay of union officers.  Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain such 
data.  Researchers should explore additional measures of performance in models of union 
officers’ pay in future studies.   
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Implications 
First, it appears that a number of characteristics define how union presidents are paid: 1) 
pay is tied to performance, 2) pay spreads increase with level, and 3) pay increases with the 
management of larger executive teams.  It is unclear however whether this pattern is good for 
organizations.  Future studies should explore this further.  Second, it is important for researchers 
to incorporate the number of vice presidents in studies on the determinants of CEO pay, as this is 
not typically a variable included in agency theory studies. As I explained, tournament theory 
appears to be a less likely explanation for top officer’s pay in the union setting, therefore I 
believe the results found in this study are likely to be more pronounced in studies focused on 
other settings including for-profit organizations.  Third, my findings illustrate the significance of 
methodology.  Specifically, my analyses point to the significance of longitudinal studies since 
the coefficients from cross-sectional analyses can be misleading and biased.  My results also 
suggest that the choice of the dependent variable is important, as I have shown that some 
regressions used in past studies may be misspecified.   
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International Intermediate Local
Top Officer 155937 70350 28485
(137386) (175041) (52458)
[121883] [63281] [6532]
Second Officer 120215 45497 19933
(91824) (43791) (32254)
[104964] [39074] [3600]
Third Officer 104815 37353 15123
(78166) (39648) (26998)
[97719] [24996] [2230]
Members 115882 8401 960
(365418) (31374) (4309)
[14646] [2420] [265]
Estimated 44034 165743 34749
Average (156160) (1305609) (330425)
Member Wage
a
[14855] [11667] [21218]
Assets 39000 2588 626
(in thousands) (82100) (8837) (3339)
[7496] [228] [73]
Total Annual 18600 1795 422
Dues (45500) (5896) (1790)
(in thousands) [3387] [323] [82]
Number of officers 117 18 10
(200) (38) (14)
[48] [9] [7]
N 1065 9651 197181
Note: Standard deviation in parantheses.  Median in brackets.  
a
Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Unions
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Variable Top Officer Second Officer Third Officer
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(membership) .279*** .275*** .110
(.087) (.082) (.136)
Ln(avg. member wage) .066** .113*** .074*
(.026) (.025) (.041)
Ln(assets) -.068 -.123** -.059
(.050) (.047) (.078)
Constant 9.168*** 9.547*** 10.319***
(1.085) (1.020) (1.683)
Adj. R
2
.950 .959 .917
N 355 355 355
Variable Top Officer Second Officer Third Officer
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(membership) .148*** .216*** .200***
(.023) (.024) (.029)
Ln(avg. member wage) .134*** .175*** .168***
(.019) (.019) (.023)
Ln(assets) -.004 -.008 -.043*
(.018) (.019) (.022)
Constant 8.165*** 6.737*** 6.916***
(.380) (.397) (.471)
Adj. R
2
.940 .949 .944
N 3217 3217 3217
Variable Top Officer Second Officer Third Officer
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(membership) .350*** .387*** .445***
(.007) (.008) (.010)
Ln(avg. member wage) .270*** .288*** .308***
(.006) (.006) (.008)
Ln(assets) -.034*** -.027*** -.022***
(.004) (.005) (.006)
Constant 4.826*** 3.817*** 2.738***
(.087) (.098) (.118)
Adj. R
2
.948 .939 .921
N 65727 65727 65727
    * p-value < .10
  ** p-value < .05
*** p-value < .01
International Unions
Intermediate Unions
Local Unions
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
TABLE 2A
TABLE 2B
TABLE 2C
Fixed-Effects Regression of the Pay-Performance Relationship, 
Deprendent Variable: Ln(Gross Salary)
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International
All years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Top official 121883 108898 120156 114707 118970 127541 134096 125119 241336
Second official 104964 90133 102080 106578 102741 115920 125387 116296 169840
Third official 97719 81341 93535 96827 96959 102565 116972 110268 150430
Median of diff: 1st & 2nd 12987 11102 16864 11037 15970 11207 13450 12815 35594
16% 14% 17% 12% 18% 16% 10% 15% 19%
Median of diff: 2nd & 3rd 7007 6753 7184 6992 6708 7827 9785 4389 16139
9% 11% 10% 9% 8% 9% 8% 6% 9%
N 355 62 60 58 62 59 19 29 6
Intermediate
All years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Top official 63281 59443 60821 64491 65867 66649 61790 63574 55972
Second official 39074 34681 40988 42370 42890 43234 29519 31800 27305
Third official 24996 26071 27330 27804 29144 27576 15652 14210 10371
Median of diff: 1st & 2nd 8749 8073 7740 9597 10284 10431 7237 8306 6125
33% 31% 33% 33% 34% 38% 33% 38% 24%
Median of diff: 2nd & 3rd 2336 2071 1938 2797 2569 2239 2164 2588 2735
18% 17% 16% 19% 16% 18% 23% 22% 26%
N 3217 496 529 525 523 541 184 317 102
Local 
All years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Top official 6532 6051 6625 6886 7183 7039 4820 6560 8048
Second official 3600 3343 3575 3716 3832 3891 2810 3618 3720
Third official 2230 2108 2192 2304 2400 2400 1737 2317 2183
Median of diff: 1st & 2nd 1840 1684 1817 1918 1937 1991 1362 1965 2064
35% 34% 35% 35% 34% 33% 38% 37% 41%
Median of diff: 2nd & 3rd 767 731 736 778 806 805 631 820 806
29% 29% 29% 28% 27% 28% 33% 30% 30%
N 65727 11141 11197 11081 10814 10477 3857 5950 1210
TABLE 3
Test of Tournaments with Medians
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Panel A  Dependent variable: Ln(Top Officer Gross Salary)
International Intermediate Local
(1) (2) (3)
Number of officers .001* .005*** .003***
(.0007) (.001) (.0003)
ln(assets) -.080 -.006 -.035***
(.051) (.018) (.004)
ln(membership) .255*** .135*** .345***
(.088) (.023) (.007)
ln(avg. member wage) .061** .128*** .267***
(.026) (.019) (.006)
Constant 9.486*** 8.244*** 4.860***
(1.092) (.379) (.087)
Adj. R-squared .951 .940 .948
N 355 3217 65727
Panel B
International Intermediate Local
(1) (2) (3)
Number of officers -.0001 .001 -.001***
(.001) (.001) (.0003)
ln(assets) .056 .004 -.006
(.038) (.019) (.004)
ln(membership) .006 -.070*** -.035***
(.066) (.024) (.007)
ln(avg. member wage) -.047** -.042** -.016***
(.020) (.019) (.006)
Constant -.404 1.446*** .993***
(.821) (.395) (.086)
Adj. R-squared .599 .753 .681
N 355 3217 65727
Panel C Dependent variable: Ln(Top Officer Gross Salary)
International Intermediate Local
(1) (2) (3)
Number of officers .0003 .003*** .001***
(.0005) (.0009) (.0003)
ln(gross salary second officer) .747*** .461*** .509***
(.046) (.017) (.003)
ln(assets) .021 -.002 -.020***
(.037) (.016) (.004)
ln(membership) .069 .040*** .152***
(.064) (.021) (.006)
ln(avg. member wage) -.020 .049** .123***
(.019) (.017) (.005)
Year effects yes yes yes
Org effects yes yes yes
Constant 2.101*** 5.107*** 2.893***
(.905) (.351) (.072)
Adj. R-squared .975 .954 .965
N 355 3217 65727
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
    * p-value < .10
  ** p-value < .05
*** p-value < .01
Dependent variable: Ln(first officer gross salary) 
minus Ln(second officer gross salary)
TABLE 4
Agency Theory or Tournament Theory: CEO Pay and Number of Officers
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ln(membership) .046 .049 .279*** .087*** .089*** .275*** .114*** .115*** .110
(.030) (.030) (.087) (.030) (.030) (.082) (.036) (.036) (.136)
Ln(avg. member wage) .104*** .108*** .066** .108*** .111*** .113*** .096*** .098*** .074*
(.021) (.022) (.026) (.022) (.022) (.025) (.025) (.026) (.041)
Ln(assets) .338*** .337*** -.068 .329*** .329*** -.123** .368*** .369*** -.059
(.027) (.028) (.050) (.027) (.028) (.047) (.032) (.033) (.078)
Year effects no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Org effects no no yes no no yes no no yes
Constant 4.875*** 4.865*** 9.168*** 4.329*** 4.301*** 9.547*** 3.354*** 3.282*** 10.319***
(.311) (.360) (1.085) (.312) (.361) (1.020) (.370) (.429) (1.683)
Adj. R
2
.605 .602 .950 .628 .625 .959 .610 .606 .917
N 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
    * p-value < .10
  ** p-value < .05
*** p-value < .01
APPENDIX 1
International Unions: Pay-for-Performance
Dependent Variable is Ln(Gross Salary)
Top Officer Second Officer Third Officer
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ln(membership) .354*** .351*** .148*** .375*** .373*** .216*** .402*** .400*** .200***
(.018) (.018) (.023) (.018) (.018) (.024) (.020) (.020) (.029)
Ln(avg. member wage) .431*** .429*** .134*** .406*** .405*** .175*** .391*** .390*** .168***
(.015) (.015) (.019) (.016) (.016) (.019) (.017) (.017) (.023)
Ln(assets) .202*** .204*** -.004 .327*** .327*** -.008 .414*** .416*** -.043*
(.014) (.014) (.018) (.014) (.014) (.019) (.016) (.016) (.022)
Year effects no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Org effects no no yes no no yes no no yes
Constant 1.222*** 1.098*** 8.165*** -.844*** -.998*** 6.737*** -2.448*** -2.561*** 6.916***
(.154) (.167) (.380) (.157) (.171) (.397) (.174) (.190) (.471)
Adj. R
2
.594 .596 .940 .672 .673 .949 .684 .684 .944
N 3217 3217 3217 3217 3217 3217 3217 3217 3217
    * p-value < .10
  ** p-value < .05
*** p-value < .01
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
APPENDIX 2
Intermediate Unions: Pay-for-Performance
Dependent Variable is Ln(Gross Salary)
Top Officer Second Officer Third Officer
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ln(membership) .681*** .682*** .350*** .709*** .708*** .387*** .761*** .761*** .445***
(.004) (.004) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.005) (.005) (.010)
Ln(avg. member wage) .575*** .574*** .270*** .550*** .549*** .288*** .526*** .525*** .308***
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.008)
Ln(assets) .225*** .224*** -.034*** .249*** .249*** -.027*** .249*** .249*** -.022***
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.006)
Year effects no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Org effects no no yes no no yes no no yes
Constant -3.116*** -3.130*** 4.826*** -3.820*** -3.862*** 3.817*** -4.360*** -4.400*** 2.738***
(.047) (.049) (.087) (.049) (.051) (.098) (.053) (.055) (.118)
Adj. R
2
.698 .698 .948 .698 .698 .939 .683 .683 .921
N 65727 65727 65727 65727 65727 65727 65727 65727 65727
    * p-value < .10
  ** p-value < .05
*** p-value < .01
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
APPENDIX 3
Local Unions: Pay-for-Performance
Dependent Variable is Ln(Gross Salary)
Top Officer Second Officer Third Officer
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Panel A  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Number of officers .002*** -.002*** -.002*** .001* .011*** -.005*** -.005*** .005*** .029*** -.001*** -.010*** .003***
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0007) (.001) (.001) (.0005) (.001) (.0004) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
ln(assets) .375*** .374*** -.080 .222*** .223*** -.006 .226*** .225*** -.035***
(.027) (.027) (.051) (.014) (.014) (.018) (.003) (.003) (.004)
ln(membership) .102*** .105*** .255*** .401*** .399*** .135*** .723*** .724*** .345***
(.030) (.030) (.088) (.018) (.018) (.023) (.004) (.004) (.007)
ln(avg. member wage) .126*** .129*** .061** .453*** .451*** .128*** .586*** .585*** .267***
(.021) (.021) (.026) (.015) (.015) (.019) (.005) (.005) (.006)
Year effects no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Org effects no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant 11.274*** 3.752*** 3.717*** 9.486*** 10.195*** .504*** .417** 8.244*** 8.805*** -3.374*** -3.383 4.860***
(.070) (.348) (.388) (1.092) (.029) (.166) (.178) (.379) (.008) (.047) (.049) (.087)
Adj. R-squared .108 .642 .641 .951 .077 .607 .608 .940 .061 .704 .705 .948
N 355 355 355 355 3217 3217 3217 3217 65727 65727 65727 65727
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Number of officers -0.0002** .0001 .0001 -.0001 -.003*** .002*** .002*** .001 -.004*** -.002*** -.002*** -.001***
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.001) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003)
ln(assets) .007 .007 .056 -.130*** -.129*** .004 -.023*** -.024*** -.006
(.011) (.012) (.038) (.010) (.010) (.019) (.002) (.002) (.004)
ln(membership) -.043*** -.042*** .006 -.034** -.036*** -.070*** -.018*** -.017*** -.035***
(.013) (.013) (.066) (.014) (.014) (.024) (0.003) (.003) (.007)
ln(avg. member wage) -.004 -.004 -.047** .018 .017 -.042** .027*** .028*** -.016***
(.009) (.009) (.020) (.011) (.011) (.019) (.004) (.004) (.006)
Year effects no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Org effects no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant .281*** .587*** .587*** -.404 .627*** 2.269*** 2.291*** 1.446*** .568*** .649*** .679*** .993***
(.019) (.149) (.168) (.821) (.015) (.126) (.135) (.395) (.003) (.034) (.036) (.086)
Adj. R-squared .011 .051 .037 .599 .018 .137 .138 .753 .006 .015 .015 .681
N 355 355 355 355 3217 3217 3217 3217 65727 65727 65727 65727
Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Number of officers -.00005 -.0001 -.00009 .0003 .0002 -.0005 -.0005 .003*** .00005 -.004*** -.004*** .001***
(.00009) (.0001) (.0001) (.0005) (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0009) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003)
ln(gross salary second officer).9377*** .907*** .908*** .747*** .785*** .709*** .708*** .461*** .884*** .713*** .713*** .509***
(.014) (.021) (.023) (.046) (.007) (.012) (.012) (.017) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.003)
ln(assets) .041*** .041*** .021 -.027*** -.026** -.002 .048*** .047*** -.020***
(.014) (.014) (.037) (.010) (.010) (.016) (.002) (.002) (.004)
ln(membership) -.030** -.029** .069 .093*** .091*** .040*** .194*** .196*** .152***
(.013) (.013) (.064) (.014) (.014) (.021) (.003) (.003) (.006)
ln(avg. member wage) .008 .008 -.020 .145*** .144*** .049** .188*** .188*** .123***
(.009) (.009) (.019) (.012) (.012) (.017) (.004) (.004) (.005)
Year effects no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Org effects no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Constant .965*** .877*** .877*** 2.101*** 2.688*** 1.755*** 1.744*** 5.107*** 1.522*** -.505*** -.487*** 2.893***
(.155) (.162) (.178) (.905) (.071) (.118) (.126) (.351) (.012) (.033) (.034) (.072)
Adj. R-squared .935 .937 .936 .975 .798 .809 .809 .954 .856 .870 .870 .965
N 355 355 355 355 3217 3217 3217 3217 65727 65727 65727 65727
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
    * p-value < .10
  ** p-value < .05
*** p-value < .01
Dependent variable: Ln(first officer gross salary) minus Ln(second officer gross salary)
International Intermediate Local
Dependent variable: Ln(Top Officer Gross Salary)
International Intermediate Local
APPENDIX 4
Agency Theory or Tournament Theory: CEO Pay and Number of Officers
Dependent variable: Ln(Top Officer Gross Salary)
International Intermediate Local
